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Abstract
We investigate privacy violations occurring when non-confidential patient data is com-
bined with medical domain ontologies to disclose a patient’s protected health infor-
mation (PHI). We propose a framework that detects privacy violations and eliminates
undesired inferences. Our inference channel removal process is based on controlling
the release of the data items that lead to undesired inferences. These data items are
either blocked from release or generalized to eliminate the disclosure of the PHI. We
show that our method is sound and complete. Soundness means the only inference
paths generated logically follow from released data and corresponding domain knowl-
edge. Completeness means we detect all inference channels leading to undesired data
disclosures. Our approach maximizes data availability by minimizing the number of
data items to be generalized or removed.
In Phase 1 of our research, we construct an optimal solution which disrupts all
privacy violations. We have developed a cost model based on the number of data
items that are removed or generalized. We calculate the cost for each solution and
select the solution with the lowest cost as the optimal solution.
Phase 2 of our research introduces heuristic-based improvements into our ap-
proach. We have developed a method to construct a solution, called an inference
disruption cover. We use the entropy of the concepts within domain ontology to
guide selection of the best facts in a disruption cover for generalization.
In Phase 3, we extend our privacy model to incorporate personal privacy pref-
erences and safety. We provide mechanisms to specify a patient’s personal privacy
restrictions as well as a clinician’s safety criteria. We introduce privacy and safety
v
labeling of data items. We develop conflict resolution strategies when privacy and
safety labels are contradictory. Our conflict resolution strategy favors safety over
personal privacy.
Lastly, in Phase 4, we propose a graphical tool to support patients’ understanding
of the privacy settings. Our tool provides brief tutorials about health data types,
regulations, and typical healthcare data sharing. We also allow patients to view their
medical data and data inferred using domain knowledge. This will help the patient
understand the impact of releasing their data through a Health Information Exchange
or for secondary use. Our graphical interface allows patients to request that specific
data items be blocked from being released. An important aspect of our approach is
that it sets the foundation for creation of patient-specific privacy policies.
In summary, the primary contribution of this work is a sound and complete frame-
work capable of efficiently detecting and disrupting healthcare-focused inference vi-
olations. We extend the privacy model to incorporate patient-specific privacy and
safety preferences. Finally, our proof-of-concept prototype implementation supports
privacy preserving data release and real-time policy composition.
vi
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Protected Health Information (PHI) is defined as health information collected on or
about a patient’s past, current, and future condition and identifiers that link data
back to the individual patient. PHI is protected by the Privacy Rule of the Federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 [14]. While a
healthcare entity may act as the custodian of a patient’s data, the data is traditionally
considered to be “owned” by the patient. Without the patient’s consent, access to
his/her health data is restricted to those with a need to know. In addition, data may
be released outside of a health care entity for reasons such as public health, quality
improvement and research studies; in these cases, the data is usually de-identified
and not linked to a specific patient. Federal, state and local law determines what
data can and cannot be accessed or released and for what purposes. The intent of
these laws is to protect a patient’s privacy.
On the black market, a stolen medical identity often sells for multiple times more
than that of a stolen credit card number, making it a prime target for attackers [25].
Large-scale data collection and development of health care ontologies allow malicious
users to automate the inference of medical facts with a high level of confidence.
Current legislation and due diligence in data release protocols is not sufficient to
protect against post-release inference capabilities. Health Information Exchanges
(HIE) are now commonplace and allow the exchange of identified patient data between
disparate entities. While regulated, the HIE data exchange process has the potential
to expose a patient’s private data [10]. With a heightened awareness of threats to
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their medical data, patients are becoming concerned and need a proactive capability
to set limits on release of their personal information.
There has been significant work on understanding the database inference problem.
Farkas, et al., [12, 4] look at inference channels in statistical and relational databases
as well as inference issues with data mining which incorporate disparate data sets and
metadata. This work assumes that data resides with the data custodian, allowing
controls on data design, access, and query construction to be locally enforced. Jain,
et al., [18, 16, 19] have looked at the use of Resource Description Framework (RDF)
[15] metadata and ontologies to control access to sensitive data sets. Their work also
assumes data containing privacy-breaching inference channels has not be released
outside the organization. Iwaya [17] uses ontologies to assess and alter data sets prior
to release, but the goal of his work is to ensure that the data set is anonymized /
de-identified, which is not always the desired outcome. Lastly, Ellick [6] has worked
on schemes to segment private medical data and many commercial medical software
vendors have developed tools to identify HIPAA-designated patient identifiers as well
as constructed data release masking or obfuscating filters, but none of this work
addresses the post release inference problem.
We present an integrated privacy framework, called the Pre-Release Inference
Analyzer (PIA), which guarantees that an attacker cannot access unauthorized data
from a released data set even if the attacker can access domain knowledge and in-
ference tools. The goal of the framework is to identify privacy violations that can
be inferred by leveraging domain ontologies. Our solution will block inference paths
that lead to disclosure of sensitive data. We propose a data modification approach
based on ontology-guided data generalization.
We propose the PIA framework which is composed of three functional modules:
inference path generation (Reason), evaluation (Detect Violations), and solution de-
termination (Build Solution). Once the “Initial Data” is received, the framework will
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iterate over all possible inference disruption solutions. The optimal solution is then
selected and applied to the Initial Data. This modified data set is then returned as
an authorized data set. Note that a solution will always be found although the cost
may prohibit the solution from returning a useful data set.
Our current work is focused on the medical / healthcare domain, but we feel
that the approach is applicable to many other domains. We are planning to ex-
tend our model to support patient-specific policies in the future. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first that introduces an integrated framework designed to
pre-evaluate data releases by identifying privacy violating inferences introduced by
domain ontology-based reasoning.
Our theoretical results show that our solution is sound and complete. Intuitively,
soundness means that the only inference paths generated logically follow from the
release data set and the corresponding domain knowledge. Completeness means that
we detect all inference channels leading to undesired data disclosures. We also show
that our approach only modifies data items contributing to an inference channel
disruption and preserves data availability by minimizing the number of data items to
be modified.
Our work is the first, to the best of our knowledge that introduces sound, complete,
and minimal algorithms to leverage domain knowledge to suggest database instance
modifications to defeat the privacy violating inference paths. Soundness ensures that
the framework does not introduce any data items that should not exist in the final
data set. Completeness ensures that all data items that should exist in the final data
set are present. Minimality ensures that we maximize data availability by modifying
the minimal data required to reach the goal.
We use the Apache Jena framework for reasoning over our data sets and domain
ontologies, both represented as RDF data sets. The PIA framework identifies all
inference-introduced privacy violations and proposes a solution that defeats the in-
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ference paths while maximizing data availability. In addition to theoretical results,
empirical results from our prototypes indicate that with integration of solution lim-
iting heuristics, implementation of the approach is practical. We need to further
evaluate using large-scale data sets, but test results to this point are positive.
We develop sound, complete, and minimal algorithms for the identification of vio-
lations as well as the nomination and evaluation of solution sets. More specifically, our
algorithms evaluate all database instance items that contribute to privacy violations.
We evaluate the items as a collection and evaluate their impact to violating paths,
both directly and indirectly, as well as their involvement in non-violating paths. We
develop a cost function that considers each data item individually and collectively to
determine the best modification solution set to return.
1.1 Motivation
Medical data is considered sensitive and private, in fact it may be the most private
piece of information that a person can posses. While there are many reasons to
release a patient’s medical data, including payment, treatment, quality, research,
and syndromic surveillance, current due diligence in release protocols is not sufficient
against post-release inference capabilities. With advances in healthcare ontologies,
data contained in a patient’s record has much more semantic depth. This depth is
beneficial, as it allows healthcare professionals to gain better insight into a patient’s
condition, treatment, and outcome. Data scientists can use predictive models and
reasoning engines to expose “unseen” facts, providing caregivers new information to
assist in the assessment and treatment of a patient. Unfortunately, with the good
comes bad – the rich semantic depth of a patient record also gives a criminal actor
the ability to expose private data that was never intended to be shared. On the
black market, an individual’s medical identity is worth 10− 20 times more than their
credit identity, making healthcare data a prime target for attackers. Private medical
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data can be used for blackmail, pharmacy purchases, insurance fraud and many
other illegal activities. With expanded data collection and advances in healthcare
ontologies, an actor does not require extensive medical knowledge to infer missing or
intentionally excluded medical facts. Technology advances have given cyber attackers
new weapons to automate the inference of medical facts with a high level of confidence.
Attackers can ‘regenerate’ unreleased sensitive data based on non-sensitive released
data, complex ontologies and reasoning tools. There are United States laws that
protect a patient’s privacy; unfortunately, many cyber attacks are launched from
foreign soil. With a heightened awareness of threats to a their medical data, patients
are becoming concerned and need a proactive capability to set limits on release of
personal information.
1.2 Running Example
In our running example, we address the privacy problem in data from the healthcare
sector. The running example database contains our medical ontology with concepts
and relations about patients, physicians, medications, and diseases. A graphical
illustration of the ontology and ontological instances is shown in Figure 1.1.
For privacy labels, we use privacy values: Public, Low, Medium, and High. The
label values range from Public indicating no privacy to High indicating the highest
privacy level available.
We define a set of patterns which are used for the assignment of privacy labels.
Patterns are generic and expressed as RDF triples. Each pattern may contain a
“wildcard” designator in any part of the triple. Our database and the ontology are
also stored in the RDF triple format allowing for straightforward pattern matching.
A pattern is associated with a single privacy label (see Table 1.1). We map patterns
to instance facts to determine appropriate privacy labels for each fact.















































Figure 1.1 Running Example Medical Ontology - includes people, medical
specialties, medications, and diseases. Several instance data items (facts) are also
shown.
Table 1.1 Example pattern templates and associated privacy labels.
Pattern Privacy Label
(∗, ∗, Patient) Not Private (public)
(∗, ∗, Physician) Not Private (public)
(∗, ISA,Hepatologist) Low Privacy
(∗, diagnosedWith, ∗) Low Privacy
(∗, given, Interferon) Medium Privacy
(∗, diagnosedWith,Hepatitis− C) High Privacy
named Bob and a physician named Leonard. Leonard is Bob’s physician of record
(Bob, hasPhysician, Leonard) and Leonard is a hepatologist (Leonard, ISA, Hepatol-
ogist) who treats liver associated diseases such as Hepatitis C (Hepatologist, treats,
Hepatitis-C). Bob also has relationships to the disease Hepatitis-C (Bob, diagnosed-
With, Hepatitis-C) and the medication Interferon (Bob, given, Interferon). Note that
medication Interferon may be used in the treatment of the disease Hepatitis C (Inter-
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feron, givenFor, Hepatitis-C). Mapping these instance facts to our privacy mapping
patterns gives us the privacy assignments shown in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Example instance facts with privacy labels.
Instance Privacy Label
(Bob,ISA,Patient) Not Private (public)




Example 1.2.1 (Inference Violation). Consider the medical ontology and its in-
stances in Fig 1.1. Assume the following domain ontology rule exists: (Patient, treat-
edBy, Hematologist), (Patient, Given, Interferon)→(Patient, likelyHas, Hepatitis-C).
To protect privacy, we are not releasing that Bob has Hepatitis-C. We are will-
ing to release all other instance data. Once released, an observer noticing that the
patient’s diagnosis is not revealed could reason over the released data and domain
ontologies. Reasoning could infer what disease the patient has based on physician
relationships and the use of specific medications. For Bob, we observe that his physi-
cian is a hematologist, who is a liver specialist and he takes a medication used to
treat Hepatitis-C. Given these facts and rule, it is probable that Bob is being treated
for Hepatitis C, so this new fact may be inferred. The new fact increases our available
information, but also violates our privacy restriction by exposing unauthorized data
that was more private than we intended to release (see Table 1.2).
To eliminate the undesired inference, we investigate the rules and patient data
that contributed to that inference. When analyzing the rule, we determine that
there are two facts, (Bob, given, Interferon) and (Bob, treatedBy, Hepatologist), that
contribute to the inference. The second fact, (Bob, treatedBy, Hepatologist), is itself
inferred from relations (Bob, treatedBy, Leonard) and (Leonard, ISA, Hepatologist).
Taking all four facts into consideration, we could choose to remove the fact (Bob,
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treatedBy, Hepatologist) from the data set. This appears to break the inference, but
unfortunately this fact would get re-created in a subsequent inference based on facts
(Bob, treatedBy, Leonard) and (Leonard, ISA, Hepatologist). If we choose to remove
the fact (Bob, given, Interferon) instead, the inference would be broken and the
removed fact is not re-created in a subsequent fix point, based on the data available.
1.3 Research Tasks
This dissertation presents our research findings addressing the following areas:
1. Privacy Analysis – Determine if reasoning over domain knowledge and non-
sensitive may generate privacy violations. Develop methods to disrupt unde-
sired inferences by removal or generalization of select data items.
Focus areas:
• Privacy model
• Data inferencing and privacy
• Cost model
Publications:
• M. Daniels and C. Farkas, “Health Data Privacy: A Case of Undesired
Inferences”, Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE Conference on Biomedical and
Health Informatics, pp. 291 - 294
• M. Daniels and C. Farkas, “Undesired Inferences: Ensuring Privacy in
Health Data”, submitted to Information Systems journal, under review
• M. Daniels and C. Farkas, “Medical Privacy in the 21st Century", in
progress, to be submitted to JAMIA - Journal of the American Medical
Informatics Association
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2. Efficient Disruption – Develop heuristics that increase our methods computa-
tional efficiency while still guaranteeing removal of privacy violations.
Focus areas:
• Exhaustive results analysis
• Heuristic methods
• Enhanced cost model
Publications:
• M. Daniels, J. Rose and C. Farkas, “Protecting Patients’ Data: An Ef-
ficient Method for Health Data Privacy”, submitted to the 13th Interna-
tional Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2018),
under review
3. Privacy & Safety –Extend privacy model to include safety and patient privacy
preferences.
Focus areas:
• Enhanced Privacy model
• Enhanced cost model
Publications:
• Enabling Preferences in the Healthcare Data Privacy Model, to be sub-
mitted
4. Graphical User Interface – Design a graphical user interface to provide tutorials
and privacy information. Also allow patients to view their data and any new
data generated by reasoning over domain knowledge.
Focus areas:
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• Patient privacy tutorials and information
• Presentation of reasoning on patient data
• Setting of patient preferences
Publications:
• Educating Patients: Understanding and Participating in the Release of
Their Health Data, to be submitted
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses related work.
Chapter 3 describes the architecture and approach of our framework.
Chapter 4 describes our optimal exhaustive approach.
Chapter 5 describes efficient disruption using heuristics.
Chapter 6 extends our privacy model.
Chapter 7 describes our patient-focused user interface tool.




The primary focus of our work is defeating privacy violating inferences in data that
is approved for release using traditional privacy controls. There has been increased
attention given to the protection of healthcare data over the last few years. As we
increase the volume and detail of data being stored about a patient, the potential for
a privacy breach increases. Advances in ontologies and semantic processing enrich
this data further increasing its value to the clinician and patient as well as the actor
seeking to leverage it for for profit or unethical motives.
2.1 Medical Data Privacy
Research in the area of medical data privacy / protection has focused on restricting
access of specific data items. Traditional methods look at data items as discrete
objects and identify confidentiality levels specific to those objects. These methods
then allow object access only to appropriate users. If objects are classified as a
group (or document), the group classification is typically the highest classification of
all member objects or a classification based on the static aggregate of data objects.
These traditional controls work on an object level and do not address information that
can be inferred either between the objects within the collection or when combined
with domain knowledge or other publicly accessible data collections. If a data item
is classified in advance and viewed in isolation, it can be protected using one of many
traditional data access methods. Pfleeger [22] describes these methods including
directories or containers, Access Control List (ACL), and Role-Based Access Control
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(RBAC). These methods are widely used and common in the majority of commercial
operating systems, databases, and applications.
Extensions to the traditional controls have been proposed to either deal with
unique data sets or access patterns. Rashid et al. [24], proposed the Temporal
Reflexive Database Access Control (TRDBAC) to address confidentiality with regards
to data with temporal sensitivity. Rashid’s concern was that a data item in isolation
may not be sensitive, but if it has a discoverable temporal relationship to one or more
other data items, it may then be sensitive.
Ellick [6] worked on schemes to segment private medical data and many com-
mercial medical software vendors have developed tools to identify HIPAA-designated
patient identifiers as well as constructed data release masking or obfuscating filters,
but none of this work addresses the post release inference problem.
Most of the techniques used to ensure the data in a release will not disclose
an individual’s identity will also alter its effectiveness in data mining tasks. One
of the most common tasks seen in data mining is the classification problem. To
address classification problems, the data miner will usually build a model based on a
training data set. The model is based on the assumption that the training data set
is ‘realistic’ and carries distribution characteristics similar to the full (unclassified)
data set. Trying to build a model on a data set that consists of perturbed data would
not provide realistic results since data values are removed, generalized, or altered,
all altering the distribution of the attributes. Agrawal [1] describes a mechanism for
applying pre-release processing on the original data set that alters it in a predicted
manner. He claims that the alterations can be made in a way that preserves the
distribution of the data. Once released, the researcher can apply algorithms that will
reconstruct nearly accurate distributions for the altered data, but will not reveal the
original values of the data, therefore preserving privacy.
Afrawal’s pre-release processing of the sensitive attributes creates new values using
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one of two data modification approaches. The first is alteration based on value-class
membership where attributes are ‘partitioned into a set of disjoint, mutually-exclusive
classes’ – discretization would be an example of this approach. The second approach
is based on value distortion where values are altered based on a random value from a
known distribution. Agrawal’s research is focused on reconstructing attribute distri-
butions for the building of a decision tree classifier model and considers both Uniform
and Gaussian distributions in his results. Once data was released, Agrawal described
three distribution reconstruction algorithms (Global, ByClass, Local), all based on an
iterative approach to estimating the original distribution. Each of the 3 algorithms
applies the reconstruction at differing levels:
• Global applies it to each attribute while looking at the entire training set
• ByClass first splits the training set up by class and then applies the reconstruc-
tion to each class
• The Local approach is similar to ByClass, but performs reconstruction at each
node; this is the point where decisions are made regarding how to construct the
node branch decision (usually based on some information gain strategy).
Using a derived privacy metric, based on how closely a modified attribute can be
estimated, Agrawal was able to show very good performance on decision trees built
using the ByClass and Local methods when compared to decision trees created using
the original data. They were also able to show that as the privacy level of the released
data increased, the accuracy of each of the approaches degraded.
2.2 Inference Problem
There has been significant work on understanding the database inference problem,
but the majority of this work assumes data remains with the data custodian, allowing
controls on design, access, and query construction to be locally enforced. The goal of
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recent work is to disallow an unauthorized user to see inferred data items that exceed
their access permissions. Various methods have been proposed in the literature to
disrupt or hide the conclusion of an inference channel making it unavailable to an
unauthorized user.
Farkas, et al., [12, 4] look at sensitive data disclosures created by indirect access
to data via unchecked inference channels. They describe the inference problem as
it relates to both statistical data and relational (general) databases. In addition
to single data sources, they also investigate the inference problem as it relates to
data mining where the data instance incorporates numerous disparate data sets and
metadata.
Brodsky, et al., [4] look at data dependent and independent disclosures caused by
unauthorized inferences. They provide a framework that evaluates incoming queries
based on Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and an audit of the historical data pre-
viously provided to the requestor. Brodsky’s approach evaluates possible inferences
based on what the user already has (previous queries) and what they ask for (current
query). The results of these inferences are then evaluated by MAC for appropriate-
ness to release to the requestor based on the user’s authorization level. This scheme
requires the data custodian to maintain control of the data sent and release data to
requestors only through carefully controlled, evaluated, and auditable queries. Brod-
sky does not consider cases where externally released data is combined with ontologies
or other publicly accessible data to generated privacy violating inferences.
2.3 Medical Ontologies and Inference Engines
The use of ontologies to enhance the semantic value of healthcare data is increasing at
a rapid rate. The combination of medical ontologies and inference engines are helping
clinicians better understand patient data as well as generate knowledge to help treat
patients and enhance medicine in general. Early ontologies were focused on enhanc-
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ing operational efficiency and billing, but their use has expanded into areas touching
all aspects of clinical care. Noor and Cheng [21, 7] are using these technologies to
better understand patient data properties and predict drug-drug interactions, while
Fernández-Breis [13] is helping to determine phenotypes and identify patient cohorts
for vital medical research. While medical ontologies are often focused on specific do-
mains, work like BRIDG [3] is looking across domains and across information system
databases. This work seeks to provide semantic interoperability that significantly
increases the value of data and its ability to generate new knowledge.
A key factor in clinical decision support is a patient’s problem list; the com-
pleteness of the list may determine the quality of the decision support process. De-
varakonda [9] says that if a patient problem list is complete and accurate it will help
clinicians provide better patient care, but the list is often inaccurate, duplicative, and
out of date due to the manual effort required to validate and update information.
Devarakonda proposes an automated method based on the IBM Watson inference
technology. Wright [26] is using semantic processing over patient clinical and billing
data to automate the generation of a more complete problem list.
Healthcare is a data-rich environment and the more enhanced the ontologies and
inference processing get, the better we can leverage data for the good of the pa-
tient and healthcare operations. While ontologies are widely used, there are needs
to extend and enhance their value. Quesada-Martinez [23] claims that many medical
ontologies provide rich domain-based knowledge, but are closer to controlled vocab-
ularies or taxonomies than the ontologies needed for medical semantics. To address
this, Quesada-Martinez proposes a method to enhance ontologies by looking at the
structure of labels across ontologies and analyzing any patterns found. These patterns
are then investigated to determine if they reference existing ontological entities.
The healthcare domain has spawned numerous ontologies in recent times. Many of
these started as proprietary vocabularies and taxonomies and started to see widespread
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adoption as the need for tighter systems integration and health information exchanges
grew. There are still many issues that impede full adoption and use. One such issue
is ontology translation. Most ontologies were developed using a specific language
(i.e., English, French, etc.) and then translated to other languages. Healthcare in-
formation exchange is now being conducted globally by medical facilities in many
countries speaking many languages. The reliability of these translations remains an
open problem still being studied [8].
With all the sensitive patient data being stored and generated, access control is
paramount. Ontologies can also be used to help with access control. Jain, et al.,
[18, 16, 19] have looked at the use of RDF metadata and ontologies to control access
to sensitive data sets. Their work also assumes data containing privacy-breaching
inference channels have not been released outside the organization. Iwaya [17] uses
ontologies to assess and alter data sets prior to release, but the goal of his work is






We have developed an integrated privacy framework, “Pre-Release Inference Ana-
lyzer” (PIA). PIA ensures that no unauthorized data can be generated from a set of
authorized data, even if the attacker has access to domain knowledge and inference
tools. Our solution disrupts inference paths that lead to disclosure of sensitive data.
The disruption is accomplished by modification of the initial authorized data set.
We propose two data modification techniques: data removal and data generalization.
The research challenge is to minimize the need for data alteration, thus maximizing
data availability. These approaches are discussed in Chapter 4.
To facilitate privacy violation detection, we decorate inferred data with privacy
labels. We evaluate inferred data to determine appropriate privacy labels. Data items
are represented using RDF triples, (subject, predicate, object), there may be differing
privacy criteria for each element of the triple. To resolve the potential privacy to a
single label, we choose to assign privacy labels based on patterns (Definition 3.3.4).
Each pattern will have an assigned privacy label. Patterns may include variables as
the exact instance values in a data set are not known. Once the inference process is
complete and paths examined, all patterns can be reduced to ground patterns (Exam-
ple 3.3.1). In the mapping of patterns to privacy labels, a more specific variation of
a pattern is at least as privacy restrictive, if not more, than a more general variation
of that pattern. For efficiency and without loss of generality, we exclude evaluating
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Figure 3.1 Pre-Release Inference Analyzer (PIA) Architecture
As depicted in Figure 3.1, our logical process can be viewed as having three
primary processes, reasoning, violation detection, and solution construction.
The three parts of the overall process are managed by a controlling function that
forms a processing loop within the overall framework. In aggregate, our approach
can be categorized into Pre-Processing, Assessment, PIA Process, and Post-
Processing as follows:
Pre-Processing
• The initial database is minimized by removing redundant data items. Efficiency
is improved since redundant data items, which would be regenerated through




• Derive all data items that can be inferred from the minimized database and
domain knowledge.
• Assign privacy labels to inferred data items. Privacy labels are assigned accord-
ing to patterns. The most restrictive privacy label is assigned to each newly
generated fact.
• Evaluate privacy policy violations. Inferred data item labels are compared with
a privacy threshold provided for the data release. Ground facts that participate
in inference of privacy violations are identified.
• Solutions and associated costs are generated based on alteration (removal and
generalization) of identified facts.
PIA Process Each solution is evaluated as follows:
• Copy initial database altering data items per solution.
• Derive all data items that can be inferred from the altered database and domain
knowledge.
• Assign privacy labels to inferred data items.
• Evaluate privacy policy violations. Inferred data item labels are compared with
privacy threshold provided for this data release
• Solutions are marked valid if no privacy violations found, else marked invalid.
Post-Processing
• Initial database is returned as authorized release if no violations found in initial
assessment.
• Initial database altered by a valid solution with lowest cost is returned as au-
thorized release if violations were found in initial assessment.
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Our approach to unauthorized inference removal leverages domain knowledge. It
alters inference participating facts to disrupt associated inference paths. We show
that our approach terminates and is sound, complete, and minimal.
• By sound, we mean that every generated (inferred) data item logically follows
from the initial data instance and domain knowledge.
• By complete, we mean that every data item that logically follows from the
initial data instance and domain knowledge is generated.
• By minimal, we mean that there is no other valid solution that costs less (based
on our cost methodology).
Detailed descriptions of modules and their properties are presented in Section
3.4.1.
3.3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the formal definitions and models used by the PIA
framework.
3.3.1 Data Model
We model external data (input and output) in a standard and consistent manner.
The primary source of domain knowledge for our framework is a collection of one
or more ontologies (Definition 3.3.1). Within our framework, we use a consistent
ontology model to represent all referenced ontologies and instance data (database).
We model domain ontology metadata as a RDF Knowledge Base (KB) [15]. This
approach encapsulates ontological concepts, relations and domain information (i.e.
domain rules) in a common model.
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A ‘domain ontology’ is an ontology whose semantic terms and definitions are
specific to a given area or topic (e.g. legal, geographic, medical). In our work, we are
focusing on data and ontologies in the healthcare / medical domain.
Definition 3.3.1 (Ontology). An ontology O = (C,R,Dom, ν) is a 4-tuple where:
• C = {c1, . . . , cn} represents the set of all concepts in O.
• Rn = {rn1, . . . , rnm} is the set of relations among the ontological concepts.
A mapping function, denoted ρ, maps relations such that ρ : rni → (cl, ck),
i = 1, . . . ,m, (l, k) = 1, . . . , n, cl, ck ∈ C, and rni ∈ Rn. For convenience and
without loss of generality, we represent the relation mapping ρ : rnj → (ci, ck)
as the triple (ci, rnj, ck).
• Dom is a set of the domains of the concepts {c1, . . . , cn} of O, such that Dom
= {dom(c1), . . . , dom(cn)}, where dom(ci) is the domain of ci.
• ν is a mapping from each concept to its domain ν : ci → dom(ci).
The data that an entity desires to release to one or more other entities is referred
to as the ‘release data set’; for simplicity, we will just use the term ‘data set’. We will
use the terms ‘initial data set’ and ‘final data set’ to describe the data being released
prior to processing by our framework (initial) and after processing (final).
Within the constructs of our framework, we refer to data sets as databases. For-
mally, each database is an ontological instance (Definition 3.3.2). Ontological in-
stances are knowledge bases which includes information from referenced ontologies as
well as an instance data set. The knowledge base describes both the instance values
and concepts as well as the relations between them. Inheritance of concept properties
and relations (Definition 3.3.3) is based on the ontological ISA hierarchy.
Definition 3.3.2 (Ontological Instance). An instance of the ontology O is defined
as OI = (I,DB), where:
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• I = {inst1, . . . , instz} is a set of instance values, such that:
– (insti, ISA, cj) ∈ DB
– insti ∈ ν(cj)
• DB = {db1, . . . , dbx} represent the database of relations between instances and
ontological concepts. Each relation is a triple of either the form (ci, rnj, ck) or
(insti, ISA, ck) or (insti, rnj, instk).
Definition 3.3.3 (Inheritance). Relationships among concepts and instances are in-
herited based on the concept hierarchy of the ontology. ∀ci, cj, rn, oi, oj; if ∃(ci, rn, cj)
and (oi, ISA, ci) and (oj, ISA, cj), where oi is either a concept or an instance, then
(oi, rn, oj) must also exist.
Intuitively, a relation describing a class also describes that class’s family of sub-
classes. Inheritance is transitive for the special relation ‘ISA’ such that, if (a,ISA,b)
and (b,ISA,c) then (a,ISA,c). The special relation ‘ISA’ is also reflexive, (a,ISA,a).
Data items within a database are represented using RDF triples, (subject, pred-
icate, object). While we assign privacy labels to a data item triple, there may be
differing privacy criteria for each element of that triple. To resolve potential privacy
inconsistencies of triple elements to a single label, we assign privacy labels based on
patterns (Definition 3.3.4) to determine a triple’s final privacy label. Each pattern
will have an assigned privacy label. Patterns may include variables as the exact in-
stance values in a data set are not known until processed. Once the reasoning process
is complete and inference paths evaluated, each pattern can be reduced to a ground
pattern (Example 3.3.1).
Definition 3.3.4 (Patterns). A pattern is defined as p = (ci, rn, cj), where c(i,j) are
constants, concept names, or variable names and rn is a relation name or variable
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name. A ground pattern gp = (ci, rn, cj), is a pattern where c1 and c2 are constants
or concept names and rn is a relation name.
Note: We use the wild-card symbol ‘*’ in any position of a pattern to represent
an unspecified variable name.
Example 3.3.1 (Patterns). Examples of patterns are: (x, isPatientOf, Smith), (x,
takesMedication ,y), (y, isMedicationType, Controlled), where x and y are free vari-
ables.
Examples of ground patterns: (John, isPatientOf, Smith), (John, takesMedica-
tion, Morphine), (Morphine, medicationType, Controlled); where all free variables
have been resolved to constants.
Definition 3.3.5 (Pattern Containment). Let p1 = (c1, rn1, c2) and p2 = (c3, rn2, c4)
be patterns. We say that p2 is contained in p1, denoted as p2 ⊆pc p1, iff the following
hold:
• (c3, ISA, c1), or both c3 and c1 are variables, or c1 is a variable
• (rn2, ISA, rn1), or both rn2 and rn1 are variables, or rn1 is a variable
• (c4, ISA, c2), or both c4 and c2 are variables, or c2 is a variable
In the mapping of patterns to privacy labels, a more specific variation of a pattern
is at least as privacy restrictive, if not more, than a more general variation of that
pattern. For efficiency and without loss of generality, we exclude evaluating data
against patterns that are ‘contained’ in other patterns (Definition 3.3.5).
Example 3.3.2 (Pattern Containment). Let p1 = (Male, Consumes, Fruit), p2 =
(Boy, Eats, Orange). If (Boy, ISA, Male), (Eats, ISA, Consumes) and (Orange, ISA,
Fruit) exists, then p2 ⊆pc p1.
Let p3 = (Male, Consumes, x), p4 = (Boy, Eats, Orange). If (Boy, ISA, Male)
and (Eats, ISA, Consumes) exist and x is a variable, then p4 ⊆pc p3.
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To determine if a rule is satisfied by a database instance (and therefore generates
a new data item), we must determine if the patterns, and symbols in those patterns,
all map to constants in the database. We address this determination in steps, looking
first at symbols, then patterns, and finally the inference rule.
Definition 3.3.6 (Symbol Mapping). Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} be a set of symbols,
including constants (values, concept names, and relation names) and variables. Let
C be the set of constants (values, concept names, and relation names). γ is a symbol
mapping, γ : S → C, such that the mapping preserves constants (i.e., if s1 is a
constant and γ : s1 → c2 then s1 = c2) and equalities.
Definition 3.3.7 (Pattern Mapping). Let γ be a symbol mapping and (ci, rn, cj)
a pattern. Γ is a pattern mapping using γ, such that Γ (ci, rn, cj) = (γ(ci), γ(rn),
γ(cj)), and Γ preserves constants and equalities.
Example 3.3.3 (Pattern Mapping). Let S = {x,enrolledIn,Mark, y, CSCE-899,
USC} be a set of symbols and C a set of constants, C = {enrolledIn, Mark, CSCE-
899, University, USC}. Given a pattern (Student, enrolledIn, x), we can find a
symbol mapping γ, such that γ(Student) = Student, γ(enrolledIn) = enrolledIn,
γ(x) = CSCE − 899. Using γ, we have a pattern mapping Γ (Student, enrolledIn,
x) = (γ(Student), γ(enrolledIn), γ(x)) = (Student, enrolledIn, CSCE-899).
The mapping of symbols and patterns allows us to determine if the body of an
inference rule (Definition 3.3.8) is satisfied. Satisfaction of a rule (Definition 3.3.9)
will lead to the inference or generation of a data item. If this data is not already
present in the ontological instance (Definition 3.3.2), it will be added.
Definition 3.3.8 (Inference Rule). An inference rule is a Horn Clause expression of
the form ∀x1, . . . , xk(p1∧ · · · ∧ pn)→ q where x1, . . . , xk are all the free variables that
appear in patterns p1, . . . , pn and q is a pattern, such that q does not contain any
variables that do not also appear in p1, . . . , pn.
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Example 3.3.4. Using the database sample shown in Table 3.1, an example rule
((x, ISA, Patient) ∧ (x, takesMedication, Aspirin) ∧ (x, complainsOf, StomachPain))
→ (x, likelyHas, StomachUlcer) would conclude that ‘John likelyHas StomachUlcer’
as all parts of the premise are satisfied. It would not conclude that ‘Mary likelyHas
StomachUlcer’ since one part of the premise ‘x, complainsOf, StomachPain’ is not
satisfied when x is ‘Mary’.












Definition 3.3.9 (Rule Satisfaction). Single Rule: let r = p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pk → q be a
rule and DB a database. We say DB satisfies r if there exists a mapping Γ from
p1, . . . , pk to the DB, i.e., given Γ(p1), . . . ,Γ(pk) ⊆ DB then Γ(q) must also be in the
database. Rule Set: let R = {r1, . . . , rn} be a set of rules and DB a database. We
say DB satisfies R if there is a Γ such that DB satisfies Γ for all ri, i = 1, . . . , n, and
Γ preserves constants and equalities.
Example 3.3.5 (Rule Satisfaction). Let there be a rule, r: (x, ISA, Male) ∧ (x, ISA,
CEO) → (x, earns, $500K) Assume the database DB contains the following facts:
(John, ISA, Male), (Mary, ISA, Female), (John, ISA, CEO), (John, earns, $500K).
We can find mapping γ from the symbols in the body of r to DB as: γ(earns) =
earns, γ($500K) = $500K, γ(Male) = Male, γ(CEO) = CEO, γ(ISA) = ISA. We
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can find mapping Γ from the body of r to DB as: Γ(x,ISA,Male) = (John,ISA,Male),
Γ(x,ISA,CEO) = (John,ISA,CEO), but then Γ(x,earns,$500K) = (John,earns,$500K)








Figure 3.2 Single Inference Path - This figure shows a graphical representation of
the inference path for rule a1 ∧ a2 ∧ · · · ∧ an → b, where b is an authorized inference.
Conceptually, our framework’s internal data model is based on an undirected
multi-graph. In this model, nodes represent semantic facts. Each node in the graph
is a triple, defined as (subject, predicate, object). Graph edges connect the nodes that
participate in an inference path with the inference conclusion (Figure 3.2). Nodes
may participate in numerous inference paths and conclusions from one path may
contribute to the satisfaction of another path (Figure 3.3). Edges are colored to
indicate specific inference paths. Only one node in any colored path will be designated
as the conclusion. The conclusion will have a privacy label assigned and may be
designated as a privacy violation.
The internal model allows nodes in the rules making up an inference path to
be decorated with attributes as they are discovered and collectively analyzed. This
allows attributes, such as privacy labels, to be easily set and accessed. The model (as
shown in Figure 3.3) allows us to show which nodes participate in which inference




















Figure 3.3 Inference Paths - Multiple intersecting paths. Conclusions are
represented by squares (authorized) and octagons (unauthorized) to visually
differentiate them. Note that the conclusion of one path may be a participant in
another path.
tracking of privacy violating nodes (facts). Through examination of the interaction
between nodes on the various inference paths, we can establish metrics on inference
participation by a given fact. These metrics allow us to nominate candidate concepts
for inclusion in our inference disruption process.
3.3.2 Privacy Model
Our privacy model defines a partial order set of privacy levels and associated labels.
Dominance between labels is defined to indicate which privacy labels are more sensi-
tive or restrictive than others. The model provides a mapping function to determine
the privacy level of a specific data item and provide a label. The privacy levels and
associated labels are based on domain-specific criteria. We are concerned with the
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privacy of a patient’s medical data and define multiple levels of data privacy. In our
approach, we use patterns as the basis for privacy label assignment. A pattern may
be broad in scope, using very general concepts in its definition or narrow in scope,
using specific concepts that are more granular and impart more detailed knowledge.
A pattern may contain ‘wildcard’ characters to indicate that only part of the pattern
needs to be matched for its application to be applicable. A given data item may
match numerous patterns and patterns from different domains. Through inheritance,
a specific data value would also match more general variations (ancestors) of the same
concept. Additional patterns may be matched if any patterns contained a ‘wildcard’.
Regardless of the number of patterns matched, the privacy label used for the data
item must represent the highest level of privacy found for all matched patterns. Our
partial-order privacy labels are monotonically increasing in value and correlate to
increasing privacy levels. Using an access lattice construct, we are able to evaluate
labels and determine the appropriate privacy level and label even if multiples are
matched. The final level will always be the least upper bound of all labels found
using pattern matching.
Traditionally, an authorized release is a data set that does not contain information
exceeding a specified privacy threshold. This threshold may vary depending on the
intended recipient(s) of the data. Threshold determination is often made based on
the presence or absence of discrete data values known to violate a given privacy level.
Definition 3.3.10 (Privacy Mapping). Let L = ({l1, . . . , ln},≤) denote the set of
privacy labels and the partial order among the labels; and let P = ({p1, . . . , pm},⊆pc)
denote all patterns and the containment among the patterns. The privacy mapping λ,
denoted λ : P → L, assigns a privacy label to each pattern and satisfies the following:
if p2 ⊆pc p1 then λ(p2) ≥ λ(p1).
Intuitively, the privacy label of the more specific pattern must dominate the pri-
vacy pattern of the more general pattern.
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Table 3.2 Patterns, potentially with wildcards, are matched to an RDF triple
allowing for mapping of a privacy label to the triple.
Pattern Example
(∗, ∗, ∗) (*, *, *)
(ci, ∗, ∗) (Ebola, *, *)
(∗, rj, ∗) (*,infectedWith,*)
(∗, ∗, ck) (*, *, Blood)
(ci, rj, ∗) (Blood,infectedWith,*)
(∗, rj, ck) (*,infectedWith,Ebola)
(ci, ∗, ck) (Blood,*,Ebola)
(ci, rj, ck) (Blood,infectedWith,Ebola)
Definition 3.3.11 (Privacy Label Multiple Inheritance). Let p be a pattern such
that p ⊆pc pi, i = 1, . . . , k. Let λ(p1), . . . , λ(pk) represent the privacy labels of
p1, . . . , pk respectively. The privacy label of p, denoted as λ(p), must satisfy λ(p) ≥
LUB(λ(p1), . . . , λ(pk)).
Intuitively, this requirement aids the assignment of privacy labels to patterns
without privacy labels (i.e., newly generated triples).
Example 3.3.6 (Privacy Labels). Let p, p1, and p2 be patterns such that p ⊆pc p1
and p ⊆pc p2. Let l1 = (TopSecret, {A,B}) and l2 = (Secret, {C}) be the pri-
vacy labels of p1 and p2 respectively. The privacy label of p ≥ LUB(l1, l2) =
(TopSecret, {A,B,C}).
Definition 3.3.12 (Authorized Data Instance). Given a user u with privacy classi-
fication λ(u), we say that data instances I = {i1, . . . , il} are authorized to read for
user u only if λ(u) ≥ λ(ij), j = 1, . . . , l, where λ(ij) is the privacy label of instance
ij.
Note, in this paper we address confidentiality (privacy) of patients’ data. While
our model is similar to the Bell-La Padula model [11] used for Mandatory Access
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Control (MAC), the write operations are different in medical databases. Our ongoing
work addresses audit and preservation of each write operation of the authorized user.
In order to set a threshold on the highest acceptable privacy label for data within
an authorized data instance, we define a single label to serve as the violation threshold.
No data item in the authorized data instance should have a label greater than that
of the violation threshold.
Definition 3.3.13 (Violation Threshold Label). The violation threshold label, de-
noted v, is the label which must not be dominated by any other label in the database.
Using Definition 3.3.10, we say that if v is a violation threshold label, then @ l;
l ∈ L and l > v.
When viewed in isolation, one may assume an initial data instance is an authorized
data instance. This assumption is reasonable given traditional data access models;
if all distinct data items in the instance are authorized to be read by user u, then
the collection of data items (instance) must also be authorized to be read by user
u. Unfortunately, with the introduction of domain knowledge and reasoning tools,
new information may be generated that is not authorized to read by user u. This
new information must be addressed if we want the released instance to truly be an
authorized data instance.
3.3.3 Inference Processing
In order to eliminate the generation of new privacy violating data items, we disrupt
the inference path leading to their conclusion. An optimal set of disruptions must be
derived to guarantee that the data being released is an authorized data instance. Be-
fore discussing our approach in detail, we must review several aspects of the inference
process and approaches used to measure solution efficiency.
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Each generated data item comes into existence as the conclusion of some set of
inference rules satisfied over DB, the initial data instance (Definitions 3.3.8 and 3.3.9).
Definition 3.3.14 (Minimal Inference Graph). Aminimal inference graph is a partial
order directed acyclic graph (DAG) of the rules r1, . . . , rn such that the body of rule
rj contains qi, the conclusion of rule ri, that proceeds rj in the DAG, (i,j = 1,. . . ,n).
Example 3.3.7 (Minimal Inference Graph). Let DBorig be a database instance and
r a rule:
• DBorig = {(Joe, hasGender, Male),(Male, Eats, Fruit)}
• r = (x, hasGender, Male) ∧ (Male, Eats, Fruit) → (x, Eats, Fruit)
• Constants in DBorig are denoted C, where C = {Joe, Male, Fruit, hasGender,
Eats}.
• Symbols in r are denoted S, where S = {x, Joe, Male, Fruit, hasGender, Eats}.
• Symbols map as follows: γ(x) = Joe, γ(Male) = Male, γ(Fruit) = Fruit.
γ(hasGender) = hasGender, γ(Eats) = Eats.
• Patterns in r map as follows: Γ(x, hasGender, Male) = (γ(x), γ(hasGender),
γ(Male)) = (Joe, hasGender, Male); Γ(Male, Eats, Fruit) = (γ(Male), γ(Eats),
γ(Fruit)) = (Male, Eats, Fruit); Γ(x, Eats, Fruit) = (γ(x), γ(Eats), γ(Fruit))
= (Joe, Eats, Fruit)
After application of rule r on DBorig, the conclusion of r, (Joe, Eats, Fruit), is added
to the database; DBr is the resulting database:
• DBr = (Joe, hasGender, Male),(Male, Eats, Fruit),(Joe, Eats, Fruit)
Definition 3.3.15 (Rule Containment). Given 2 inference rules with the same con-
clusion:
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• r1 : p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pk → q (more restrictive)
• r2 : p̄1 ∧ · · · ∧ p̄n → q (more general).
We say that r2 is contained in r1 iff ∀ pattern pi, (i = 1, . . . , k), in the body of rule
r1, ∃ pattern p̄j, (j = 1, . . . , n), in the body of rule r2, such that p̄j ⊆pc pi.
Intuitively, this means that if a database instance satisfies the more specific rule,
is also satisfies the more general rule.
Example 3.3.8 (Rule Containment). Let r1 and r2 be rules such that
• r1 = (Joe, takes, antibiotic) ∧ (antibiotic, treats, infection) → (Joe, has, infec-
tion)
• r2 = (Joe, takes, amoxicillin) ∧ (amoxicillin, treats, BacterialInfection)→ (Joe,
has, infection)
Given (amoxicillin, ISA, antibiotic) and (BacterialInfection, ISA, infection) hold, then
r2 ⊆pc r1.
A fact participates in the inference process if that fact is found in the body of
any rule that is executed during reasoning. Since rule variables are resolved during
reasoning, all facts are grounded upon completion of the reasoning process. A rule
may be executed multiple times, but with different conclusions. Since a conclusion
of one rule may be used to satisfy a variable in the body of another rule, not all facts
found in rule bodies exist in DB.
Definition 3.3.16 (Inference Participant). Let s be a data item found in instance
database DB and r a rule satisfied by DB. We say that s is an inference participant
over r if at least one pattern in r maps to s.
A fact may participate in the inference of numerous conclusions. The degree of
direct participation of a fact is the number of times f is found in bodies of executed
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rules. Since, as previously stated, a conclusion of one rule may be used to satisfy a
variable in the body of another rule, we define degree of indirect participation to also
include conclusions that a fact indirectly participates in (initial conclusion is used to
infer additional conclusions). Note that removal of a fact from DB would cause any
rule dependent on that fact to not be satisfied and therefore not reach a conclusion.
Likewise, if a rule was dependent on a conclusion which was not generated (due to
removal of a fact), then that rule would also not be satisfied and therefore also not
reach a conclusion.
We define database inference removal to be the process of disrupting an inference
path which concludes in the generation of a privacy violating data item. Our approach
to database inference removal leverages domain knowledge and alters facts on the
inference path to disrupt the generation of privacy violating data items. We show
that our approach terminates and is sound, complete, and minimal.
• By sound, we mean that every generated (inferred) data item logically follows
from the initial data instance and domain knowledge.
• By complete, we mean that every data item that logically follows from the
initial data instance and domain knowledge is generated.
• By minimal, we mean that there is no other valid solution that costs less (based
on our cost methodology).
3.4 Pre-Release Inference Disruption
In this section, we describe the initial approach used in our framework to detect
and disrupt privacy violating inferences. The approach is exhaustive and seeks to
determine an optimal solution. We describe the goal of the approach followed by




In this section, we present our algorithms to construct an authorized data instance,
DBF , from an initial data instance, DB0, and domain knowledge, O. We assume
availability of a sound RDF reasoner.
Disrupt Violations (Main)
The approach for defeating privacy violating inferences is shown in Algorithm 1. For
convenience, we reference a function “Reason” to call a RDF reasoner. We first
create a minimized database, DBm, to remove all redundant data. Reasoning and
privacy mapping are then performed to allow detection of privacy violations; the set
of identified violations are stored in SV . If violations are found, a solution set is built
and evaluated (Algorithm 4). The selected (optimal) solution, S, is lastly applied to
the initial database yielding an authorized data instance, DBF . Note the selected
solution, S, will be null if no violations are detected. In this case, the initial data
instance will be released with no alterations.
ALGORITHM 1: DisruptViolations
Input: DB0 - initial instance database
Input: O - ontology
Input: v - violation threshold label
Input: λ - privacy mapping function
Output: DBF - authorized instance database
1 DBm = MinimizeDB(DB0, O) // minimized database
2 DBmf = Reason(DBm,O) // fix point database
3 C = set of inferred facts from DBmf // inferred fact list
4 SV = PrivacyMapAndDetect(C, v, λ) // privacy violation list
5 if SV 6= ∅ then
6 S = ExhaustiveDisruption(DB0,DBm,O,v,λ,DBmf ,SV )
7 else
8 S = ∅
9 end




Removing redundant data items early in the disruption process improves algorithm
efficiency. Any solutions based on redundant data items would not prove useful since
altered data items would be regenerated in the reasoner step. To avoid redundant data
items, we reduce the initial data instance to a minimized data instance (Algorithm 2)
before processing. A minimized data instance does not contain any data items that
follow from remaining data items. As can be seen by the steps of Algorithm 2, we
evaluate each fact, f , in DB for redundancy by reasoning over a copy of DB with
f removed (DB − f) and testing for regeneration of f . The output data instance,
DBm, has all redundant data items removed.
ALGORITHM 2: MinimizeDB
Input: DB - instance database
Input: O - ontology
Output: DBm - minimized database
1 DBm = DB
2 forall f ∈ DB do
3 DBw = DBm − f
4 DBwf = Reason(DBw, O)
5 if f ∈ DBwf then




Claim 3.4.1 (Database Minimizing). Algorithm 2 removes all redundant data items
and only redundant data items.
We prove Claim 3.4.1 in two parts. We first address removal of “only” redundant
data items followed by addressing removal of “all” redundant data items.
Proof of Database Minimizing - remove only redundant data. Assume, by
contradiction, that our algorithm removed a data item f , f ∈ DB, that was not re-
dundant. Then f must have been generated in the reasoning step (line 4) of Algorithm
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2, because it must have appeared in DBwf (condition at line 5). So, if in the final
returned minimized database f is not redundant, it can only occur if another fact,
f1, that contributed to generating f , was removed incorrectly, i.e., f1 was removed
although it was not redundant. Then f1 must have been generated in the reason-
ing step, because it must also have appeared in DBwf . So, if in the final returned
minimized database f1 is not redundant, it can only occur if another fact, f2 that
contributed to generating f1, was removed incorrectly, i.e., f2 was removed although
it was not redundant. But then there must exist an inference path, f1, . . . , fk, over
data item fi ∈ DB (i = 1, . . . , k) for each redundant data item that contributed to
generating f . Since each data item fi ∈ DB (i = 1, . . . , k) was removed from DBm
only if it could be generated from the remaining data instances and we have finite
number of facts in DB, therefore, we eventually reach the empty set. This contradicts
our original assumption.
Proof of Database Minimizing - removes all redundant data. Assume, by
contradiction, that our algorithm did not remove f , a redundant data item. In step
3 of Algorithm 2, we investigate all data items of the original database. So, since f
is redundant, it must be regenerated by the reasoning step (line 4). In this case, by
the condition at line 5, f would be removed from DBm. This contradicts our original
assumption that f is redundant, but was not removed.
Privacy
In this section, we present an algorithm to detect privacy violations. We assume that
all generally released data items are permitted to the users. Here, we investigate
access control violations of all newly inferred facts. We use the privacy mapping
function λ and violation threshold label v, such that an inferred fact will be added
to the privacy violation list if the relation λ(inferred fact) > v holds.
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ALGORITHM 3: PrivacyMapAndDetect
Input: C - Set of inferred fact in DB
Input: v - Violation threshold label
Input: λ - Privacy Mapping Function
Output: SV - Set of violation facts
1 SV = ∅ // Initialize privacy violation (SV) set to null
2 forall c ∈ C do
3 λ(c) is the privacy label for the triple held in c
4 if ¬(λ(c) ≤ v) // c violates privacy
5 then





Exhaustive Disruption (Algorithm 4) initially creates a superset of all ground facts
participating in the inference path of an identified privacy violation. Each member
of the superset is evaluated for its ability to eliminate all undesired inferences. For
evaluation, we remove all facts of the potential solution set from the initial database.
We reason over the altered database, and check whether all violations have been
avoided. The final solution is one that avoids all privacy violations and has the
lowest cost.
A valid solution, determined by the absence of detected violations (line 25) is
marked accordingly and its cost noted. While iterating though all solutions, a valid
solution with the lowest cost seen is tracked (lines 12 and 13). Once all solutions are
evaluated, the valid solution with lowest cost is returned as optimal (line 31). Note
that a worst case solution (i.e., all facts in the data instance altered to the ontology
root) is possible.
Definition 3.4.1 (Valid Data Alteration). Given a data item d = (c1, r1, c2) and
ontology O, a valid data alteration of d is d′ = (c3, r2, c4), such that:
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ALGORITHM 4: ExhaustiveDisruption
Input: DB0 - initial database
Input: DBm - minimal initial database
Input: O - Ontology
Input: v - violation threshold label
Input: λ - privacy mapping function
Input: DBmf - fix point of DBm over O
Input: SV - privacy violating concepts in DBmf
Output: S̄ - selected solution
1 begin
2 SS = SolutionSet(DBm, O,DBmf , SV ) // Comment Candidate
Powerset
3 minCost = +∞
4 forall S ∈ SS do
5 DBw = AlterData(DB0, S)
6 DBwf = Reason(DBw,O)
7 C = set of inferred facts from DBwf
8 SV ′ = PrivacyMapAndDetect(C, v, λ)
9 if SV ′ = ∅ then
10 set solution state of S to “valid”
11 if solution cost of S < minCost then
12 minCost = solution cost of S // track minimum cost
13 S̄ = S // track best solution
14 end
15 else






• c3 = c1, c3 is the immediate parent or grandparent concept of c1 in O, or c3 is
the root concept of O; i.e., (c1,ISA,c3) in O.
• r2 = r1, r2 is the immediate parent or grandparent relation of r1 in O; i.e.,
(r1,ISA,r3) in O.
• c4 = c2, c4 is the immediate parent or grandparent concept of c2 in O, or c4 is
the root concept of O; i.e., (c2,ISA,c4) in O.
By “immediate” parent and grandparent, we mean those parent and grandparent
relations that exist after the transitive “ISA” edges are removed from ontology O.
In our initial work, we focus only on the data item alteration of the object com-
ponent of a triple (i.e., c2 in (c1, r, c2)). We also limit our alterations to component
removal and generalization. For our purposes, removal means we replace the com-
ponent with the ontology’s root component – we denote removal of component a as
6a. Generalization means we replace the component with its parent or grandparent
based on ISA relations in the given ontology – we denote generalization of a to its
parent as a′ and generalization to is grandparent as a′′.
Algorithm 5, solution set, returns the power set of all facts that contributed to the
inference that violates the privacy policy. We define a solution set as a set of one or
more solutions. A solution is defined as a 2-tuple comprised of an alteration set and a
solution status. An alteration set is one or more alterations, each a 3-tuple comprised
of original RDF triple, object of altered triple, and alteration cost. Solution status is
a 2-tuple comprised of solution state and solution cost. Values for solution state are
“unknown”, “valid”, and “invalid”. Alteration and solution costs are real numbers.
Example 3.4.1. Let SS be a solution set with one solution S such that S = ( (
((Dave, hasDisease, CHF), CV, 0.5), ( (Dave, takesMed, Med-3.1-4), Med-3, 0.75)
), (valid, 1.25) ). The solution S is interpreted as follows: the first alteration alters
(Dave, hasDisease, CHF) to (Dave, hasDisease, CV) at a cost of 0.5, the second
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alteration alters (Dave, takesMed, Med-3.1-4) to (Dave, takesMed, Med-3) at a cost
of 0.75. The solution state is “valid” with a total solution cost of 1.25.
To build the solution set SS, Algorithm 5 first evaluates each rule which concludes
a detected privacy violation. The rule evaluation is performed by Algorithm 6 which
evaluates the lineage of the fact by investigating each satisfied fact in the left side
(body) of the rule. If the fact is grounded, it is added to the candidate list. If the
fact is inferred, then Algorithm 6 is called recursively on the rule which generated
the inferred fact. At completion, Algorithm 5 returns a candidate list containing all
candidate facts contributing either directly or indirectly to generation of a detected
privacy violations.
Once the candidate list is built, the solution set is constructed as a quaternary
powerset of candidate list members.
The solution set is built to support an exhaustive approach and considers all
possible alteration options for each candidate. A candidate list of size n will produce
22n − 1 solutions (see Example 3.4.2).
ALGORITHM 5: Solution Set
Input: DBm - minimal initial database
Input: O - Ontology
Input: DBmf - fix point of DBm over O
Input: SV - privacy violating concepts in DBmf
Output: SS - powerset of candidate facts
1 P = ∅ // P - remember paths followed
2 C = ∅ // C - candidate list
3 forall v ∈ SV do
4 r = rule satisfied by O and DBm which generates v




Example 3.4.2. Let v be a data item identified as a privacy violation. Let r1
be a rule that generated v, r1 : A ∧ B → v. The candidate list would consist of
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{A,B}. Each element in the candidate list would have valid 3 alteration options
(i.e., for A, options would be A′, A′′, A′′′). The solution set would consist of the
following solutions: {{A→ A′}, {A→ A′′}, {A→ A′′′}, {B → B′}, {B → B′′}, {B →
B′′′}, {A → A′, B → B′}, {A → A′, B → B′′}, {A → A′, B → B′′′}, {A → A′′, B →
B′}, {A → A′′, B → B′′}, {A → A′′, B → B′′′}, {A → A′′′, B → B′}, {A → A′′′, B →
B′′}, {A→ A′′′, B → B′′′}}. See Figure 3.4.
State 0























































Figure 3.4 Solution States used in generalization. Replacement of the RDF triple
object’s concept is based on position in the ISA hierarchy of the ontology.
Information detail is lost as we generalize up the hierarchy.
Alteration options are defined which perform either full removal or either one or
two levels of generalization. For convenience, we define a mapping function θ defined
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as θ : (O, c) → ĉ to assist in building generalizations. θ maps an ontology, O, and a
concept, c, to ĉ, the parent of concept c in the ontology hierarchy (i.e., c,ISA,ĉ). If
no parent is defined for c in O, θ maps to the root of the ontology. θ only considers
“immediate” ISA relationships and ignores transitive ISA relationships.
ALGORITHM 6: GetCandidates
Input: DBm - minimal initial database
Input: O - Ontology
Input: DBmf - fix point of DBm over O
Input: r - rule to follow
Input: P - rules processed
Input: C - Candidates
Output: C - Updated Candidates
1 F = facts on left side (body) of rule r
2 forall f ∈ F do
3 if f ∈ DBm then
4 f is ground fact
5 if f /∈ C then
6 add f to C // add to candidate list
7 end
8 else
9 f is inferred fact
10 r′ = rule satisfied by O and DBm which generates f
11 if r′ /∈ P then
12 add r′ to P // remember path




17 return C // updated candidate list
Claim 3.4.2 (Candidate List Complete). The candidate list, C, includes all facts
that contribute to a privacy violation.
Proof of Candidate List Complete. Assume, by contradiction, that data item
f contributes to the generation of a privacy violation v, but f /∈ C. Let r be the rule
that generates v. There are two ways which f can contribute to the generation of v,
direct or indirect. If direct, then f is a ground fact which satisfies rule r. In this case,
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f would be identified as contributing to v in Algorithm 6 lines 2 (component of rule
r) and 3 (ground fact) and added to C (line 9). Since f /∈ C, we know that f does
not directly contribute to v, therefore, f must indirectly contribute to the generation
of v. In this case, f is a ground fact satisfying a rule in v’s inference path. So, f
must satisfy some rule ri such that the head of rule ri is in the body of rule ri+1,
i = 1, . . . , n, and the head of rule rn is in the body of rule r. The inference path is
followed by the recursive calling of Algorithm 6 on line 19. When the recursive call
reaches a rule where f is a ground fact satisfying that rule, f would be identified as
contributing in lines 2 and 3 and added to C (line 9). This is a contradiction to our
assumption that f contributed to the generation of v but v /∈ C.
Claim 3.4.3 (Candidate List Sound). The set of solutions computed by Algorithm 5
contains only data items that contribute to a privacy violation.
Candidate List Sound. Trivially follows.
Inference disruption solutions are built using combinations of data from the can-
didate list, denoted C, built in Algorithm 6. The solution set, SS, is constructed by
Algorithm 7. The solution set is exhaustive and incorporates all alteration options
for each candidate concept. Our approach is to build a modified powerset based on a
quaternary counter. Each bit of the quaternary value represents a concept in C and
the state of the bit represents an alteration option. Note that counting is performed
with bits reversed (i.e., 10, 20, 30, 01, 11, 21, etc.). The solution set will contain
tq − 1 solutions where t is the number of alteration options and q is the number of
concepts in the candidate list. When counting, the quaternary value with all 0’s is
ignored as it creates an empty solution.
Example 3.4.3 (Quaternary Powerset). Let C be a candidate list with two concepts,
a and b. Alteration options for a would be a′, a′′, and 6a. Alteration options for b are
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constructed similarly. The quaternary counter increments from 00 to 33 as shown in
Table 3.3. Counting produces 15 solutions (24 − 1) which consider all concepts and
alteration options.
Table 3.3 Solution generation (quaternary) example values showing the count and
corresponding solution.
Count Solution Count Solution Count Solution
10 a′ 21 a′′ b′ 32 6a b′′
20 a′′ 31 6a b′ 03 6 b
30 6a 02 b′′ 13 a′ 6 b
01 b′ 12 a′ b′′ 23 a′′ 6 b
11 a′ b′ 22 a′′ b′′ 33 6a 6 b
Claim 3.4.4 (Violation Detection and Removal). All generated data items identified
as privacy violations are removed.
Proof of Violation Removal. Assume there is a generated data item s that is
a privacy violation, but s is present in the authorized data instance. For s to be
present in the authorized data instance, it must either have existed in the initial data
set or been added by the reasoning process. It is assumed that all data items in the
initial data set are authorized, therefore s was added by the reasoning process. The
authorized data instance is created in Algorithm 1 Step 10 by altering data items
based on the selected solution. The data items needed to interrupt the inference of s
must therefore not be in the selected solution. The selected solution is taken from the
set of all solutions in Algorithm 4 Step 11. This selection is based on the solution flag
being set to true. The solution containing s must have its flag set to true. But the
solution flag is only set to true if no violations are found for the solution. Therefore
s was not a violation. This is a contradiction.
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ALGORITHM 7: Quaternary Powerset
Input: C - Candidates
Output: SS - Solution Set
1 t = 4 // do quaternary counting
2 q = |C| // candidate list size
3 b[0 . . . q − 1] = 0 // initialize bit mask
4 p=4q // number of solutions
5 for i = 0 to p do
6 add 1 to b[0] // add base 4
7 for j = 0 to t do
8 if b[j] < t then
9 exit inner loop // no carry digit
10 else
11 b[j] = 0
12 add one to b[j+1] // carry digit
13 end
14 end
15 new solution set
16 solutionCost = 0
17 for k = 0 to q do
18 if b[k] > 0 then include fact k
19 new alteration
20 alterationCost = 0
21 alteration source RDF tripple = C[k]
22 case b[k] do
23 case 1 : do
24 altered target object = θ(O,C[k])
25 add 0.5 to alterationCost
26 end
27 case 2 : do
28 altered target object = θ(O, θ(O,C[k]))
29 add 0.75 to alterationCost
30 end
31 case 3 : do
32 altered target object = root concept from ontology O
33 add 1.0 to alterationCost
34 end
35 end
36 add alteration to solution set
37 add alterationCost to solutionCost
38 end
39 end





Input: DB - instance database
Input: S - solution set
Output: DBF - updated instance database
1 DBF = DB // create copy of DB
2 forall ∈ S do
3 process all alterations in the solution
4 a′ = alteration RDF triple
5 DBF = DBF − a′ // remove original RDF Triple from DBF
6 update object of triple a′ to alteration object
7 DBF = DBF
⋃
a′ // insert altered RDF Triple into DBF
8 end
9 return DBF // return altered DB
Table 3.4 Cost Values for generalization actions.
Action Cost
remove c +1.0
add root (6 c) - removal -0.0
add 1 level generalized (c′) -0.5
add 2 levels generalized (c′′) -0.25
Solution Cost
To select a minimal participating fact combination (PFC) which provides unautho-
rized inference disruption, Algorithm 4 uses an exhaustive approach and evaluates
all alteration options for every PFC. The selected minimal alteration combination is
based on the cost of PFCs which are successful in disrupting all unauthorized infer-
ences. Our cost model is implemented in two parts: 1.) determine individual concept
alteration costs, and 2.) determine total PFC alteration cost.
Definition 3.4.2 (Concept Alteration Cost). Concept Alteration Cost, denoted as
Costf , is defined as follows. Let f = (c1, p1, c2) be a concept that participates in a
violation inference and therefore a candidate to defeat the violation inference. We
say that the concept alteration cost is a value from 0.5 to 1.0 that indicates the cost
of altering f . We use the values in table 3.4 to indicate the cost based on the specific
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alteration being performed on f (One level of alteration = 0.5, two levels of alteration
= 0.75, removal = 1.0).
The value of Costf is calculated in Algorithm 7 by theCASE statement enclosing
lines 22 through 35. Within this group of statements, the appropriate value from
Table 3.4 is added to variable “alterationCost” depending on the specific alteration
being performed. This variable holds the value of Costf for the current data item
(f) being processed.
Definition 3.4.3 (Combination Alteration Cost). Concept Alteration Cost, denoted
as CostS, is defined as follows. Let S = {f1, . . . , fn} be a set of concepts that are
altered to disrupt a group of violation inferences and Costfi(i = 1, . . . , n) the Concept





Intuitively, we say that the combination alteration cost for a set of concepts is the
sum of the concept alteration costs for all concepts in the set.
The value of CostS is calculated in Algorithm 7 by statement 37 which is part
of the loop over all data items in the PFC. This statement accumulates the Costf
values in the variable “solutionCost” for all data items in the PFC. At termination of
the loop, this variable holds the value of CostS for the set of data items processed.
In our model, the total cost of a PFC alteration is based on the number of facts
in the combination and the cost of specific alterations performed on those facts (level
of generalization or removal). Example 3.4.4 shows the PFC alteration cost of a two
fact combination. This example assumes both concepts must be altered to disrupt
the violations. The fact alteration cost values in this example range from 1.0 (both
concepts are generalized 1 level) to 2.0 (both concepts are removed).
Example 3.4.4 (Alteration Cost). Let a and b be concepts in PFC s. The ontology
root for a and b are denoted 6a and 6 b respectfully. First and second level generalization
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of a and b are denoted a′ a′′, b′ and b′′ respectfully. Assume that both a and b must
be altered to disrupt an identified violation. Using the values in Table 3.4 and the
definitions for Costf and CostS, the cost for each combination of alterations for s is
shown in Table 3.5.
The most costly combination 6a, 6 b removes both concepts (replaces with root con-
cept). The least costly solution a′, b′ replaces both concepts with their first level
generalizations.
Table 3.5 Cost Alteration Example - Assumes both concepts must be generalized
to disrupt inference.
Replace a, b with: CostS = Costf (a) + Costf (b)
6a, 6 b 2.0
6a, b′ 1.5
6a, b′′ 1.75
a′, 6 b 1.5
a′, b′ 1.0
a′, b′′ 1.25
a′′, 6 b 1.75
a′′, b′ 1.25
a′′, b′′ 1.5
Once all costs are calculated, each PFC is evaluated to determine if it successfully
disrupts all the identified unauthorized inferences. As PFCs are being evaluated by
Algorithm 4, the two If statements at steps 25 and 11 allow us to track the lowest
cost solution that was successful in disrupting all unauthorized inferences.
3.4.2 Properties & Proofs
Theorem 3.4.1 (Disrupt Violations). Algorithm 1 computes an authorized data in-
stance, denoted DBs for user u with privacy clearance λ(u) from an initial data
instance, denoted DBi. The algorithm terminates and DBs is sound, complete, and
minimal.
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Proof. First, Algorithm 1 must terminate since the input data set is finite and all
solution candidates are based on members of the initial data set’s powerset. Since
the initial data set is finite, the powerset is also finite. Therefore, there is a finite
number of solutions that could be evaluated, leading to termination. We still need to




Proof of soundness. Assume that s is a data item that does not logically follow
from DBi and domain knowledge, but s ∈ DBs. If s ∈ DBi, it must logically follow
since it is already present in DBi. If s /∈ DBi, then s must be generated by the
inference process. However, in the inference process every new data item generated
must come from a rule of the form p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pk → q and all components of the rule
body must either be in DBi or there must be an inference path that generates from
DBi. Recursively, we can show that there must be an inference path that generates
each component of the rule body not in DBi. If every component in the body of the
rule generating s can be generated from DBi, then s naturally follows from DBi and
domain knowledge. This contradicts our initial statement that s does not follow from
DBi and domain knowledge.
Proof of completeness. Assume that s is a data item that logically follows from
DBi and domain knowledge, but s /∈ DBs. If s /∈ DBs, the following must hold:
s /∈ DBi and no inference path exists that concludes with s. However, if s logically
follows fromDBi and domain knowledge, then either s ∈ DBi or the inference process
generates a path that concludes with s. If s ∈ DBi, then it naturally follows that
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s ∈ DBs. If s /∈ DBi, but an inference path exists that concludes in s, then it follows
that s ∈ DBs. In either case, s ∈ DBs. This contradicts our initial statement that
s /∈ DBs.
Proof of Minimality. Assume there is a valid solution q that is not selected as
the final solution, but has the lowest cost. Algorithm 4 determines the final solution.
Since q is a valid solution, it returns no violations and is identified as valid in Step 25.
The solution cost for q is then compared to the lowest cost of all solutions processed
to that point in Step 11. Since, as stated, q has the lowest cost, no other lower cost
solution will be identified by Step 11. Therefore, at the end of the evaluation loop, q
will be selected as the final solution. But this contradicts our initial statement that




4.1 Implementation & Empirical Results
We developed a prototype implementation of our inference disruption framework
written in the Java programming language. The prototype uses the Apache Jena
semantic framework [2] for RDF parsing and reasoning. The implementation logic
closely follows the algorithms described in section 3.4.1. As described in section 3.3.1,
external data is structured using the RDF standard [15].
The execution steps of a sample prototype execution are shown in Fig. 4.1.
In this execution, the initial database consisted of 3780 data items. The inference
process generated an additional 3944 data items, giving a total of 7724 triples in the
database. There are two data items in the database identified as privacy violations.
We found six ground triples that participate in the violation inference paths and a
total of 46−1 or 4095 solution sets were constructed and evaluated. Of the successful
solutions, we found that solution number 4 had the lowest cost (100) and would be
recommended as optimal to disrupt the identified violations.
To evaluate computational efficiency, we developed a series of test database input
files as described in Table 4.1. We arranged these files into three groups based on the
number of privacy violations known to exist (0, 1, 2, or 4). Within each group, we
provide five files based on patient counts in the file (100, 500, 1000, 2500, and 5000).
The total number of facts, including asserted and inferred, for each file is shown in
the table. In our test scenarios, each violation was supported by tree ground facts
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Figure 4.1 Prototype Execution. Screen shot of prototype execution. This run
found two privacy violations based on 6 ground facts.
(participants) satisfying multiple rules. As described in the discussion of Algorithm
5, the number of solution sets is (4p − 1) where p is the number of ground triples in
the inference paths of all violation data items. As shown in Table 4.1, our test data
has solution set sizes of: 40 − 1 = 0, 43 − 1 = 63, and 46 − 1 = 4095. In each test
execution, the expected violations were identified and proper privacy labels applied.
A valid solution with minimal cost was found and reported for each test execution.
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Table 4.1 Prototype execution summary timing collected for 100, 500, 1000, 2500,































































100 369 376 745 0 0 0 149 36 26 0 745
500 1741 1806 3547 0 0 0 246 31 74 0 926
1000 3456 3592 7048 0 0 0 307 35 98 0 1019
2500 8596 8947 17543 0 0 0 481 28 218 0 1387
5000 17168 17875 35043 0 0 0 781 27 459 0 1952
100 403 414 817 1 3 63 155 31 29 930 1744
500 1904 1983 3887 1 3 63 281 47 86 2190 3193
1000 3779 3941 7720 1 3 63 341 29 113 3506 4617
2500 9400 9811 19211 1 3 63 471 28 203 8334 9707
5000 18777 19606 38383 1 3 63 746 48 528 16103 18189
100 404 417 821 2 6 4095 173 44 28 21403 22593
500 1905 1986 3891 2 6 4095 267 30 57 80630 81837
1000 3780 3944 7724 2 6 4095 319 30 88 163234 164497
2500 9401 9814 19215 2 6 4095 493 26 209 443200 444847
5000 18778 19609 38387 2 6 4095 747 28 393 927606 929728
100 403 414 817 4 10 1048575 158 36 20 3657618 3691252
500 1904 1983 3887 4 10 1048575 238 35 70 18322095 18357303
1000 3779 3941 7720 4 10 1048575 264 37 110 33965367 33996151
2500 9400 9811 19211 4 10 1048575 446 37 236 74842091 74869826
5000 18777 19606 38383 4 10 1048575 721 36 479 148937788 148965619
As discussed in Section 9, cost is determined by removal and addition of infor-
mation. For the file group with zero violations, the cost is obviously 0. For the one
violation file group, the cost for all solutions ranged from 0.5 to 3.0, with the optimal
cost of a successful solution being 0.5. For the two violation file group, the cost for all
solutions ranged from 0.5 to 6.0, with the optimal cost of a successful solution being
1.0. A histogram of the one and two violation costs is shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3
respectively.
Execution times were captured during each test execution and are shown in Table
4.1. The timing values are reported in milliseconds and labeled as follows:



















Cost Distribution of Valid Combinations - 1 Solution
1 Security Violation
3 Violation Ground Triples
63 Valid Solutions
Figure 4.2 Solution Cost Distribution 1. Graph for one privacy violation with
three ground facts in its inference path.
build the internal Jena data model.
• Reason - The time to execute the Jena RDF rule reasoner over the internal data
model.
• Discover - The time for Jena to identify and return all generated data items
along with their inference paths, associated rules, and ground triples.
• Evaluate - The cumulative time to evaluate each potential solution. This time
includes iterative executions of the reason and discover logic.
• Total - This is the total time from execution start to finish.
We observe that data load time increases with external data file size, which is
expected. Execution time for the Jena RDF rule reasoner is similar for all executions






















Cost Distribution of Valid Combinations - 2 Solutions
2 Security Violation
6 Violation Ground Triples
3969 Valid Solutions
Figure 4.3 Solution Cost Distribution 2. Graph for two privacy violation with six
ground facts in their inference paths.
the data model size increases. There are two primary tasks which contribute to the
evaluate time; these tasks are reason and discover, each are executed once for each
solution in the solution set. As can be seen in the Table 4.1, increasing the violation
count from zero to one to two also increases the solution set size from 0 to 63 to 4095
respectively. This increase in solution set size causes the total run time for to increase
from 2 seconds to 18 seconds to approximately 15 minutes. While the reason time is
fairly constant, the discovery time does increase with data model size, this increase
however appears to have linear growth. The solution set size, on the other hand, has
a large impact on total execution time since it grows exponentially with each new
triple found in a violation inference path.
The trends for total execution time can be seen in the graph found in Figure 4.4.
In this graph, the X axis shows the size of the data instance (number of patients) for














































Figure 4.4 Prototype Execution Timing. Trend lines show execution time (log) in
milliseconds. Individual line corresponds to number of violations found in data
instance.
Testing of our initial prototype implementation used a limited representation of
medical data and domain knowledge. Obviously, based on our findings, it is not
feasible to run this process on a database containing a large number of facts with
violations, but we have shown that we can use domain knowledge to identify and
modify data items to disrupt violation inferences. We are currently extending our
model to include heuristics to increase efficiency while still providing low cost inference
disruption.
4.2 Findings
In our exhaustive approach, the solution set is based on every combination of data
items satisfying any rule in the path of a violating inference. The solution set can
grow to a computationally prohibitive size if there are many violations or a large
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number of data items in the inference rule bodies (n data items will produce a set
size of 22n − 1). During solution evaluation, we reason over and assess each of these
22n − 1 solutions. As can be seen in Table 4.1, database size does increase a single
solution’s execution time, but solution set size has a larger impact since it determines
how many solution evaluations must be performed. In the next section, we investigate
heuristics that can help reduce complexity and allow us to find a sufficient solution




In this section, we investigate heuristics that our methods can use to reduce overall
computational complexity and allow us to find a sufficient solution in reasonable time.
We investigate attributes and characteristics of both generated data and the infer-
ence paths that infer them. We look at the interaction between inference paths, both
those generating violation data items and those generating authorized data items. We
seek to discover information that can be leveraged to increase efficiency in our pro-
cess. We will incorporate discovered information into our algorithms as appropriate
to improve overall process performance.
To improve executional efficiency, we will address three areas that have the poten-
tial to reduce total execution time: reduction of PFC set size, optimal PFC evaluation
order, and early recognition of a satisfactory solution. We expect improvements based
on the following:
• mimimized PFC set size decreases the number of potential solutions that have
to be evaluated
• use of additional meta-data to pre-compute a better informed solution cost
before PFC evaluation supports heuristic-based decisions
• optimized order of PFC evaluation and the solution selection criteria allowing
evaluation of the most likely effective solutions first and quickly recognize a
satisfactory solution early in the process.
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We feel these enhancements will eliminate the need for a full exhaustive evaluation
of all potential solutions.
Initial meta-data to be investigated include:
• Number of authorized inferences a data item participates in
• Number of unauthorized inferences a data item participates in
• Entropy of a data item.
The following sections will discuss reduction in solutions set size, hypergraph
disruption covers, an enhanced cost function, order of PFC evaluation, and early
solution selection.
5.1 Participating Fact Combination Set Size
To reduce the number of combinations constructed, we first look at eliminating com-
binations that are not capable of being successful. While we cannot guarantee a
given combination will be effective in defeating violation generation, we can verify
that certain combinations are not capable of defeating generation of those violations.
Early elimination of ineffective combinations will decrease overall processing time
compared to the full exhaustive approach. As described in section 3.4, we address
violation avoidance by disrupting violation inference paths. The inference path for
a given violation is a partially ordered set of one or more satisfied rules; these rules
conclude with the generation of a violating data item. Each rule in the path is sat-
isfied by existence of specific data items; if those data items are removed or altered,
the rule may not be satisfied and the violation may not be generated. While removal
or alteration of an arbitrary data item does not guarantee path disruption, if at least
one data item on the path is not removed or altered, the violation will continue to be
generated.
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Definition 5.1.1 (Inference Disruptor). Let r : p1∧· · ·∧pk → q be an inference rule
and Γ a mapping from r to a database DB as defined in Definition 3.3.9. We say
that pi (i = 1, . . . , k) is an inference disruptor for r if:
• pi is a ground fact, and
• there is no inference rule r̄ such that p̄1 ∧ · · · ∧ p̄j → pi.
That is, if Γ(pi) is removed from the database DB, r would not be satisfied by DB
and therefore q would not be generated by r.
Definition 5.1.2 (Inference Disruption Cover). Given a database DB and infer-
ence rules r1, . . . , rn that generated undesired inferences. We say that the set P =
{p1, . . . , pl} is a inference disruption cover for DB if:
• For each ri(i = 1, . . . , n) there is a pj ∈ P such that pj is an inference disruptor.
• There is no P ′ such that P ′ ⊂ P and for each ri(i = 1, . . . , n) there is a pj ∈ P ′
such that pj is an inference disruptor for ri.
Definition 5.1.3 (Minimal Inference Disruption Cover). Let P be an inference dis-
ruption cover for DB and CostP the combination alteration cost of all alterations
in P (Definition 3.4.3). We say that P is a minimal inference disruption cover for
DB if no P ′ exists such that P ′ is also an inference disruption cover for DB and
CostP ′ < CostP .
Example 5.1.1 (Inference Disruption Cover). Let there be a set of rules that generate
data items as follows:
• r1: a ∧ b ∧ c→ x
• r2: b ∧ d ∧ e→ y
• r3: c ∧ e ∧ f → z
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An inference disruptor for r1 would be any member of the set {a,b,c}; for r2
any member of the set {b,d,e}; and for r3 any member of the set {c,e,f}. Assuming
alteration cost of 1 for each fact, the minimal inference disruption cover of the rule
set {r1, r2, r3} are {a,e},{b,e}.{c,b}, {c,d}, or {c,e}. This minimal cover requires
two elements, thus the minimal cost is 2.
5.2 Hypergraph Cover
In this section, we discuss a method for building a minimal inference disruption cover.
We build a minimal spanning tree over a connected set of hypergraphs. We treat the
collection of data items in each violation inference path as a hypergraph. We form
a minimal spanning tree of these hypergraphs based on common data items. The
minimal spanning tree will provide us with a minimal disruption cover.
Since different satisfied rules with the same conclusion may not be based on the
same set of ground facts, for our hypergraph cover approach to be complete, we
must consider all contributing ground facts from all satisfied rules. We must disrupt
all rules with that conclusion to be effective. Therefore, we must consider “same
conclusion” rules as linked during evaluation. If an inference disruptor is selected
from one of a set of linked rules, then an inference disruptor must be selected from
all of the linked rules.
Example 5.2.1 (Inference Disruption). Given the set of satisfied rules {r1 : a∧ b→
c, r2 : d ∧ e → f, r3 : c ∧ f → g}, the list of participating ground facts for g
is {a, b, d, e}. We can disrupt g, by altering any of the participating ground facts
since all must exist to satisfy rules r1, r2, and r3. If we add an additional rule,
r4 : h ∧ i → c, to the set of satisfied rules, the list of participating ground facts for
g becmes {a, b, d, e, h, i}. With the addition of rule r4, alteration of participating
ground facts e or f will still disrupt generation of g by removing f , but alteration
of any one fact in the set {a, b, h, i} will not disrupt the generation of g since while
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it may prevent one rule from generating c, there is a second rule that can generate
c with the remaining facts. To disrupt the generation of c we must disrupt both r1
and r4 with at least one fact from each of the two sets: {a, b} and {h, i}.
Hypergraph Construction
To illustrate the hypergraph construction, we step through a sample construction.
Let there be a set of generated data items {d, g, i, m, p, r} of which three are privacy
violations {g, p, r}. Assume the rules that generate these data items, r1, . . . , r6, are
as follows:
• r1 : a ∧ b ∧ c→ d
• r2 : d ∧ e ∧ f → g
• r3.1 : a ∧ e ∧ h→ i
• r3.2 : u ∧ v → i
• r4 : j ∧ k ∧ l→ m
• r5 : i ∧ n ∧m ∧ o→ p
• r6.1 : e ∧ f ∧ q → r
• r6.2 : s ∧ f ∧ t→ r
Note that r3.1 and r3.2 both generate i and r6.1 and r6.2 both generate r.
Before discussing hypergraph cover construction, we introduce the concept of
a disruption container. A disruption container is a grouping of hypergraphs that
generate the same conclusion (multiple rules with the same head). Since we must
disrupt all hypergraphs associated with a conclusion to truly disrupt the conclusion,
we must ensure that the hypergraphs are disrupted as a set. We use the disruption
container to enforce the disruption of all hypergraphs within a same conclusion set.
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Example 5.2.2 (Disruption Container). Let there be three privacy violations g, p,
and r as shown in Figure 5.3. Looking at violation p, we have shown that it can
be disrupted by altering any one fact in the set {j, k, l, n, o}. But the hypergraph
for p includes a disruption container. This container holds two hypergraphs that
concluded the fact i (see Figure 5.2). If we alter any single fact found in the container
({u, v, a, e, h}), we would disrupt one rule generating i, but not the other. This
would allow the violation p to still be generated. We need to alter a member of
both contained hypergraphs {u,v} and {a,e,h} to completely disrupt i and avoid the
generation of p.
To construct the hypergraph set, we transform the fired rules as follows:
1. Create a directed acyclic graph (DAG) for each rule, such that edges point
from the data items in the body to the data item of the head (see Figure 5.1).
Generated violation data items are shown in an octagon, non-violation data
items are in a square.
2. Connect rules, such that there is an edge from the head of a rule ri to the head
of a rule rj iff ri’s conclusion is in the body of rj. Figure 5.2 shows resolution of
rule dependencies on generated data items and graphically links the components
of inference paths together. Note that rules that form the same conclusion are
grouped in a disruption container. In these cases, we consider the container to
be a potential inference disruptor so both rules (AND) must be disrupted for
the container to be a valid disruptor.
3. Create hypergraphs from each DAG by creating a hyperedge with same name
as the head of the DAG and vertices corresponding to every data item in the
DAG that is not the head of a sub-DAG (i.e., does not have an edge pointing
to it). Figure 5.3 shows each of the individual graphs as a hypergraph with
generated data items removed from the hypergraph and violation hyperedges
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named based on the associated privacy violation. Note that hypergraphs in a
disruption container remain distinct from each other.
4. Connect hypergraphs by connecting their common vertices. Figure 5.4 shows





































Figure 5.1 Shows all satisfied rules, not just ones generating new data (2 rules
generate “i” and “r”). Octagons indicate violations, squares are safe inferences.
Dependent Cover
In this section, we look at violations that do not need to be disrupted and therefore
are not included in our hypergraph cover. If we have the case where one violation is
dependent upon another (see Figure 5.5), we need only address the violation being
depended on. In Figure 5.5, if we disrupt violation i then violation d will still be
generated, but if we disrupt d then i will not be generated since it depends on the
existence of d. We can see from the hypergraph in Figure 5.6 that d ⊆ i.
Claim 5.2.1 (Dependent Disruption). Disruption of an inference subset will also









































Figure 5.2 Expansion of Figure 5.1 showing rule dependencies and disruption
containers.
Proof of Dependent Disruption. Let inference data item i be dependent on in-
ference data item d as shown in Figure 5.5. Assume by contradiction, that data item
d is disrupted and no longer generated, but data item i is still generated. Since the
generation of data item i is based on the inference rule (d ∧ h ∧ g → i) , then d, h,
and g must all exist to satisfy the rule body and cause the rule head to generate i.
But, we have said that the rule generating d was disrupted and d was not generated














Figure 5.3 Rules from Figure 5.1(b) represented as hypergraphs.
would not be satisfied and i would not be generated. This is a contradiction to our
assumption that d was disrupted but i was still generated.
If there are two violation hypergraphs, A and B, and A ⊆ B, then we do not need
to disrupt the path for B directly because we are disrupting it indirectly by disrupting
the path for A. Given Claim 5.2.1, we can remove any superset hypergraphs from
the hypergraph set prior to determining disruption covers. Removal of these superset
hypergraphs may reduce the number of participating ground facts that need to be
considered in PFC construction, reducing the final PFC size and avoiding redundant
and unnecessary evaluations.
Hypergraph Cover Approach
For our hypergraph cover approach, we treat ground facts and disruption containers
within hypergraphs as items that are logically connected with the OR operator. In
other words, only one item (ground fact or disruption container) needs be altered to




















Figure 5.4 Shows Figure 5.3 with like concepts linked.
of hypergraphs that are logically connected with the AND operator. In other words,
all hypergraphs within a disruption container must be disrupted for the container to
be disrupted.
After building the hypergraphs as described earlier, we use their construction to
build a series of disruption sentences which form disruption sentence covers.
Definition 5.2.1 (Disruption Sentence). Given a rule r : p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn, a disruption
sentence of r, denoted as DSr, is an OR of all pi(i = 1, . . . , n), i.e., p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn.










Figure 5.5 Multi-violation connected rules. Connect rules where violation “i” is





Figure 5.6 Hypergraphs of connected rules with dependent violations.
the items in the rule body, u or v, will cause r to not be satisfied. Therefore, to be
a cover, either u and v must be represented by a “1” when variables are resolved in










Figure 5.7 Truth table for u, v.
Corollary 5.2.1 (Disruption Sentence Cover). Given a rule r and its disruption
sentence, any truth arrangement such that DSr is TRUE will generate a disruption
cover.
Proof of Corollary 5.2.1. Let r be a rule, r : a ∧ b → c, DSr the disruption
sentence for r, DSr = a ∨ b, and C a set of facts.
Assume that DSr resolves to TRUE, but C is not a cover for r. Since DSr
resolves to TRUE for C, either a or b must be in C. If either a or b are in C, then
removing C would leave r unsatisfied. However, if r is unsatisfied, then it would not
generate c and would be a cover. This contradicts our original statement that P was
not a cover.
Now assume that DSr resolves to FALSE, but C is a cover for r. Since DSr
resolves to FALSE for C, neither a nor b can be in C. If neither a nor b are in C,
then removing C would leave r satisfied. However, if r is satisfied, then it would
generate c and would not be a cover. This contradicts our original statement that P
was a cover.
The disruption sentences corresponding to the inference violations in Figure 5.1
are as follows:
• Logic string for g = (a ∨ b ∨ c ∨ e ∨ f)
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• Logic string for p = (((u ∨ v) ∧ (a ∨ e ∨ h)) ∨ n ∨ j ∨ k ∨ l ∨ o)
• Logic string for r = ((e ∨ f ∨ q) ∧ (f ∨ s ∨ t))
Since all three violations need to be disrupted, we connect disruption sentences
with the AND operator, giving a full disruption sentence of DS(g,p,r) as ((a ∨ b ∨ c ∨
e∨ f)∧ (((u∨ v)∧ (a∨ e∨h))∨n∨ j ∨ k∨ l∨ o)∧ ((e∨ f ∨ q)∧ (f ∨ s∨ t))). This full
disruption sentence can then be used to determine if a combination of participating
ground facts forms a complete inference disruption cover. We first construct a cover
logic statement corresponding to the ground facts and logic operators found in the
full disruption sentence.
To then determine if a combination of participating facts is a cover, we set the
corresponding variables in the cover logic statement to “1”. We set all other variables
in the cover logic statement to “0”. A bitwise evaluation of the cover logic statement
is then performed. If the evaluation resolves to “1” then the combination provides a
Inference Disruption Cover, otherwise it does not.
Example 5.2.4 (Inference Disruption Cover). Let L be the logic string from Figure
5.4, L= ((a∨b∨c∨e∨f)∧(((u∨v)∧(a∨e∨h))∨n∨j∨k∨l∨o)∧((e∨f∨q)∧(f∨s∨t))) and
G be the set off all participating ground facts participating in violations g, p, and
r, G = {a, b, c, e, f, h, j, k.l, n, q, s, t, u, v}. The following are example participating
ground fact combinations followed by the cover logic string with combination variables
set to “1” and their bitwise evaluation.
Combination {a, e, f} : ((1∨0∨0∨1∨1)∧(((0∨0)∧(1∨1∨0))∨0∨0∨0∨0∨0)∧
((1∨1∨0)∧ (1∨0∨0))) = ((1)∧ (((0)∧ (1))∨0)∧ ((1)∧ (1))) = ((1)∧ ((1)∧0)∧ (1))
= (1 ∧ 0 ∧ 1) = 0.
Combination {f, k} : ((0∨0∨0∨0∨1)∧ (((0∨0)∧ (0∨0∨0))∨0∨1∨0∨0∨0)∧
((0∨ 1∨ 0)∧ (1∨ 0∨ 0))) ((1)∧ (((0)∧ (0))∨ 1)∧ ((1)∧ (1))) = ((1)∧ ((0)∨ 1)∧ (1))
= ((1) ∧ (1) ∧ (1)) = 1.
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The combination {a, e, f} does not provide a cover since it does not disrupt any
of the ground facts in violation g and only disrupts one of the two hypergraphs in
the disruption container found in g. The combination {f, k} does provide a cover for
g, p, and r.
5.3 Cost
Our investigation into a better costing model continues our emphasis on developing
a semi-greedy approach. We defined two cost calculations in Chapter 3, the Concept
Alteration Cost (Definition 3.4.2) and the Combination Alteration Cost (Definition
3.4.3). These cost calculations assign a cost to each data item in a participating fact
combination. The discrete item cost, Costf , is based on the alterations applied to
a data item: one level of generalization, two levels of generalization, or removal (see
Table 3.4). The aggregate cost, CostS, is then calculated for a combination by adding
the components of the Costf for each data item in the combination. In the exhaustive
approach, each data item is assessed locally and any global impact is ignored. There
is also no consideration given to one data item having more informational value than
another (i.e., its impact on safe inferences, where it is found in the domain knowledge
ontology tree, or entropy loss if modified), neither within a combination or across
combinations.
In this section, we discuss refinement to our initial cost model and calculations.
These refinements will allow our costing model to provide a better gauge on the
impact each participating fact combination will have on data availability. To support
the enhanced cost function, we collect meta-data on all data items that participate
(directly or indirectly) in a privacy violating inference. The meta-data collected is as
follows:
• the alteration cost for a data item
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• the number of safe (non-violation) inference paths that the data item partici-
pates in
• the depth of the data item’s concept in the domain knowledge ontology hierarchy
• the entropy of the data item in the domain knowledge ontology.
During participant fact identification and combination construction, meta-data
will be collected and stored. The process will also store meta-data aggregate values
for alterations (source and target data items) and combinations of alterations. We
address organization and storage of the meta-data in the next sections, but first we
discuss the four categories of meta-data.
Alteration Cost
We use the same approach to calculate alteration cost for the efficient approach as we
did in the exhaustive approach (see Section 9 – Definitions 3.4.2 and 3.4.3). Values
used in the calculations are based on Table 3.4.
Inference Participation
We say that a data item participates in the inference of a generated data item if it
satisfies any rule in an inference path which concludes in that generated data item.
While we want to disrupt non-safe (violation) inferences, we would like to avoid
disrupting safe inferences. To encourage preservation of safe inferences, we increase
the cost of a combination if it disrupts safe inferences. We recursively look at all
rules that were satisfied during the reasoning process and any rules supporting those
rules (recursively). From this rule information, we determine the number of safe
(non-violation) inferences that a data item participates in. Because it is desirable to
disrupt violation inferences, we do not increase cost of a combination because of safe
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inferences that are dependent on violation inferences. This is further illustrated in
the following example.
Example 5.3.1 (Inference Participation). Figure 5.8 shows an example of nine rules
satisfied by reasoning over some data and domain knowledge. These rules are com-
prised of six safe (non-violation) inferences, (d, i,m, v, w, y), and three violation infer-
ences, (g, p, r). The rules are satisfied by 14 ground facts, (a,b,c,e,f ,h,j,k,l,n,o,q,u,x).
Since the safe inference y is dependent on the violating inference p (which we plan to
disrupt), it is not counted as a safe inference for any of the ground facts in its path.
The violation and non-violation inference participation counts can be seen in Table
5.3.1. Note that not all safe inferences are connected to violation inference paths.
In our example, inferences u, v, and y (colored grey in Figure 5.8) are safe and not
connected to any violation inferences. Since ground facts u and x are only found in
the inference paths of v, w, and y and not in any violation inference paths, they are





























Figure 5.8 All inferences paths. Paths from Figure 5.1 (secondary rules removed
for clarity) enhanced to include inference paths not contributing to violations (rule
head shown in grey). Rule conclusions v, w, and y, along with ground facts u and x,
do not participate in any of the violation inference paths.
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Table 5.1 Inference Participation - Figure 5.8 ground facts shown with
participation count for both violation and non-violation inferences.
Ground Fact Violation Count Non-Violation Count
a 2 {g,p} 2 {d,i}
b 1 {g} 1 {d}
c 1 {g} 1 {d}
e 3 {g,p,r} 2 {i,w,}
f 1 {g} 2 {v,w}
h 1 {p} 1 {i}
j 1 {p} 1 {m}
k 1 {p} 1 {m}
l 1 {p} 1 {m}
n 1 {p} 0 {}
o 1 {p} 1 {w}
q 1 {r} 0 {}
u 0 {} 2 {v,w}
x 0 {} 0 {}
Since we do not want to increase cost more than once if two ground facts in the
same cover disrupt the same safe inference, we must maintain inference participation
as a list of disrupted safe inferences instead of a discrete count value. Therefore, the
inference participation count for a data item is determined by the cardinality of its
disrupted safe inference list. The inference participation count for an alteration is the
cardinality of the disrupted safe inference list for its unaltered data item. The count
for a combination is the cardinality of the union of the disrupted safe inference list
for unaltered data items in each alteration.
Depth
By depth, we mean a measure of distance between a data item concept and the root of
its associated domain knowledge ontology. When the ontology is viewed as a tree, the
depth is the number of ISA relationships between the concept describing a data item
and the root node of the ontology. Depth gives a very broad indication of specificity;
concepts with a low depth value are close to the root and very general (the root node
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as a depth of 0 and maximum generality) while concepts with a larger depth value
are farther from the root with numerous concepts along the path (each increasing in





























Figure 5.9 Hierarchical Ontology Tree - Concepts at the top of the tree near the
root are more general, while concepts at the bottom, farther from the root, are more
specific, with C4, C5, and C6 having the most specificity.
Entropy
Entropy is a measure of uncertainty about a distinct piece of information. We apply
the idea of entropy to our data items as an additional measure of data availability.
We base our approach to entropy measurement on the work of Calmet and Daemi [5].
Calmet and Daemi proposes a a measure of entropy distance based on the Kullback-
Leibler distance (relative entropy). They define the degree of a concept within an
ontology as the number of sub-concepts under that concept in the ontology. The
degree value is then normalized over the size of the ontology (number of unique
concepts excluding the root) giving a value between 0 and 1.
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The purpose of determining the degree measurement is to show levels of ambiguity.
A low degree value (near 0) indicates a concept with little or no sub-concepts; there
is minimal ambiguity in the use of this concept in a fact. A high degree value (near 1)
indicates that a large number of sub-concepts in the ontology fall under this concept
(it is near or at the root of the ontology); there is a high level of ambiguity since
a fact using this concept may actually be better identified with one of many of its
many sub-concepts.
Using an alphabet Ω consisting of a concept in the ontology, and degree mea-
surement described above as the mass probability distribution, Calmet and Daemi








resolving to the sum of probability of N and the probability of ¬N :







This calculation assumes the following: 0 log2 0 = 0. Using these calculations, a
concept with degree = 0 (no sub-components) would have an entropy or ambiguity
value of 0 (no ambiguity) while a concept with degree = 1 (all concepts in ontol-
ogy are sub-components) would have an entropy or ambiguity value of 1 (maximum
ambiguity).
In our enhanced cost model, we use Calmet and Daemi’s approach to determine
the amount of ambiguity introduced by altering a data item to a concept closer to
the ontology tree root. We provide algorithms later in this section.
Example 5.3.2 (Entropy). Let there be an ontology with concepts (root, c1, . . . , c18)
as shown in Figure 5.10. There are 18 unique concepts in the ontology if the root
is excluded. Let there be two facts, fa, and fb that participate in the paths of
some unauthorized inference. Also let fa, and fb connect to concepts c7 and c18
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respectively. The degree of alteration options (none, one level generalization, two

















































Figure 5.10 Entropy Example - Ontology tree with 18 concepts in the ontology,
excluding the ontology root.
Table 5.2 Degree, normalized degree, and entropy values for concepts c7 and c18.
Concept Degree Normalized Entropy Concept Degree Normalized Entropy
Degree Degree
c7 0 0.0 0.0 c18 0 0.0 0.0
c′7 = c3 5 0.2778 0.5814 c′18 = c6 2 0.1111 0.3095
c′′7 = c1 10 0.5556 0.8524 c′′18 = c2 6 0.3333 0.6500
6 c7 = root 18 1.0 1.0 6 c18 = root 18 1.0 1.0
Note that in Example 5.3.2, the degree increases as we apply alterations bringing
the concept closer to the ontology root. In comparing c′7 and c′18, we see that c′18
has a lower degree than c′7 (2 versus 5) and therefore a lower entropy value (0.3095
versus 0.5814). Intuitively, this indicates that there is less ambiguity introduced by
generalizing one level from c18 to c′18 than by generalizing one level from c7 to c′7.
Information Vector
To maintain meta-data in support of the enhanced cost function, we introduce the
concept of a meta-data information vector. The generic form of this vector is used to
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track the meta-data related to a data item modification at three levels:
1. meta-data is tracked at the individual data item level
2. meta-data is tracked in aggregate for unaltered and altered data items (data
item alteration)
3. meta-data is tracked in aggregate for the set of alterations (alteration combi-
nation)
While we use the same vector construct to track the three levels of meta-data,
the content is different depending on which data level the vector is associated with.
If a vector is associated with a data item, its data is specific to that item (Definition
5.3.1), if associated with an alteration, its data is the aggregate of two data items
(Definition 5.3.2), and if associated with a participating fact combination, its data is
an aggregate of its alterations (Definition 5.3.3).
Definition 5.3.1 (Data Item Information Vector). Let f be a data item. We say
the data item information vector for f , Vf =< a1, . . . , a4 >, is a set of attributes,
such that a1 is the alteration cost associated with f , a2 is the list of distinct unsafe
inferences that f participates in, a3 is the ontology hierarchy depth of f , and a4 is
the entropy (uncertainty) of f .
Definition 5.3.2 (Alteration Information Vector). Let m be a data item alteration,
with source concept c1 and target concept c2. We say the alteration information
vector for m, Vm =< a1, . . . , a4 >, is a set of attributes, such that a1 is the sum of
alteration cost associated with data items in a, a2 is a 2-tuple where the first element
is a distinct list of safe inferences for c1 and the second element a similar list for c2,
a3 is the average ontology hierarchy depths for c1 and c2, and a4 is the difference
between the entropy for c1 and c2, (c2 − c1).
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Definition 5.3.3 (Combination Information Vector). Let c be a set of alterations
forming a PFC. We say the combination information vector for c, Vc =< a1, . . . , a4 >,
is a set of attributes, such that a1 is the sum of alteration cost associated for all
alterations in c, a2 is a 2-tuple where each element is a union of the corresponding
element for all alterations in c, a3 is the average ontology hierarchy depth for all
alterations in c, and a4 is the sum of the entropy values for all alterations in c.
Example 5.3.3 (Data Vector). Let there be an Ontology tree as shown in Figure 5.10
with entropy values shown in Table 5.2. Let there be a participating fact combination
C with 2 facts linked to ontology concepts C6 and C7 with alterations A1 and A2
such that A2 generalizes C6 one level to C2 and A1 generalizes C7 two levels to C1.
Let the safe inference list for C1, C2, C6, and C7 be {b, d, e}, {b, c, d}, {a, b}, and
{a, b, c} respectfully. The information vectors for the data items, alterations, and
combination are shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Information Vectors - Table shows the three types of information vectors.
Information Vector Alteration Safe Inferences Depth Entropy
Data Item C7 1.0 {a,b,c} 4 0
Data Item C1 -0.25 {b,d,e} 2 0.8524
Alteration A1: C7 → C1(C ′′7 ) 0.75 ({a,b,c},{b,d,e}) 3 0.8524
Data Item C6 1.0 {a,b} 3 0.3095
Data Item C2 -0.5 {b,c,d} 2 0.6500
Alteration A2: C6 → C2(C ′6) 0.5 ({a,b},{b,c,d}) 2.5 0.3405
Combination C1 = {A1,A2} 1.25 ({a,b,c},{b,c,d,e}) 2.75 1.1929
Meta-data values are pre-collected on all ground fact data items which are part
of a complete minimal inference cover. These data item meta-data values are cached
in a table for reference when building various information vectors. In some cases
data items meta data may not be available in the table since the data item being
generalized to was not in the initial data item set. In this case, the meta-data is
collected, used, and added to the table for future reference. As seen in Figure 5.11, a
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concept in the ontology hierarchy tree can have multiple identities since in addition to
its initial name, it can also be reference as the first level generalization of its children








































































Figure 5.11 Multi-identify nature of concepts when they are potential targets for
generalization or removal.
Example 5.3.4 (Multi-Identity). Given Figure 5.11, we can see that node C2 in the
ontology hierarchy tree can be referenced as C2, C ′3, C ′4, C ′′5 , C ′′6 , C ′′7 , or C ′′8 . Likewise,
C0 can also be referenced as the removal of any node in the tree. Note that while not
shown in the figure, C0 is also the first level generalization of both C1 and C2 and
the second level generalization of both C3 and C3.
Dominance
Unlike the exhaustive approach, where discrete cost values could be compared to de-
termine PFC cost dominance, the PFC cost is now based on an information vector.
The data item information and alteration vectors are building blocks for the combina-
tion information vector. It is the combination information vector that represents the
cost of a PFC so a method is needed to compare two combination information vectors
and determine which dominates (has the higher cost). We accomplish comparison by
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interrogating like meta-data in the two vectors and comparing their alteration impact
values, ImpactS (Definition 5.3.4).
Definition 5.3.4 (Alteration Impact Value). The alteration impact value, denoted
ImpactS, is the alteration cost CostS enhanced by the number of safe inferences
impacted. Let S be a PFC and U the number of safe inferences disrupted by S. We
calculate the alteration impact value of S as follows: ImpactS = CostS+(CostS∗U).
Using this definition of ImpactS increases data availability by avoiding combina-
tions that will disrupt safe (non-violation) inferences when possible. If two combi-
nations have similar alteration cost, the use of ImpactS will allow our methods to
chose the combination with lesser data availability impact.
5.4 Order of Evaluation
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we introduced a method to reduce the number of PFCs that
need to be evaluated by eliminating combinations that do not provide a disruption
cover. In Section 5.3, we enhanced meta-data collection and the cost calculation to
provide a better measure of data availability and level of data uncertainty. These
enhancements allow us to now investigate methods to further minimize combination
evaluation and arrive at an acceptable solution sooner.
Our overarching goal is to not just identify a valid solution, but to identify a valid
solution with low cost. By low cost, we mean the solution satisfies the property of
minimality (see Section 3.2). In our exhaustive approach, minimality was optimal
and achieved by searching all valid solutions for one with the lowest cost. To find an
optimal solution, all PFCs had to be evaluated prior to minimal solution selection
since all valid combinations had to be considered. However, there were inefficien-
cies inherent in the exhaustive approach – combinations that had no chance of being
successful were unnecessarily evaluated; this inefficiency was addressed using covers
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(Section 5.2). Solution covers eliminate many combinations from being evaluated,
but the exhaustive approach still evaluates all cover combinations. In this section,
we will investigate three approaches which strive to reach a solution using less evalu-
ations: low-cost selection semi-exhaustive, low-cost selection heuristic, and low-cost
high entropy traversal. The low-cost selection semi-exhaustive approach maintains
optimal minimality but may still require more combination evaluations then neces-
sary. The low-cost selection heuristic and low-cost high entropy traversal approaches
reduces evaluations further, but relax optimal minimality and instead strives for a
“reasonably” low cost solution.
5.4.1 Low-Cost Selection Semi-Exhaustive
The idea behind the low-cost selection semi-exhaustive approach is to consider all
PFCs as in the exhaustive approach, but to evaluate them in impact cost order, from
lowest cost to highest cost. Once a successful combinations is found, we designate
that combination as our solution and require no additional evaluations.
We start by using the ImpactS calculation (Definition 5.3.4) to arrange all cover
combinations in Cost Order (Definition 5.4.1) – from lowest cost to highest cost.
Definition 5.4.1 (Cost Order). Let V C = {S1, . . . , Sn} be the set of all identi-
fied PFCs based on minimal disruption covers. We say that V C is in cost order if
∀i, j(i, j = 1, . . . , n), (i < j), (ImpactSi ≤ ImpactSj). In other words, the impact
cost of Si is less than or equal to the impact cost of Sj.
Intuitively, the Impact value for all cover combinations in V C is non-decreasing
order from combination S1 to combination Sn.
Starting with the lowest cost combination, we evaluate each combination using our
reasoner and domain knowledge. If the combination removes all violations, we then
deem it successful and stop. If the combination does not remove all violations, we step
to the next lowest cost combination and evaluate it. We continue this process until we
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find a combination that is deemed successful. Based on Claim 5.4.1, we can terminate
as soon as the first successful combination has been identified, without needing to
evaluate any additional combinations. By evaluating combinations in cost order, we
eliminate the exhaustive approach inefficiency of evaluating all combinations prior
to selecting the one with minimal cost. However, while the sequential approach
can terminate early, avoiding the need to evaluate all combinations, it may still
have to evaluate a large number before finding one that is successful. Note that
if multiple combinations have equal cost, their order of evaluation is irrelevant, since
any successful combination with that cost is minimal.
Claim 5.4.1 (Early Termination). If combinations are evaluated in Cost Order
(Defnintion 5.4.1), once a successful combination has been identified, evaluations can
stop. Minimality is guaranteed as no other combination can exist which have a lower
cost.
Proof of Early Termination. Assume, by contradiction, that a successful com-
bination S is identified as minimal, but another successful combination S ′ exists and
has a lower cost. Let V C = {S1, . . . , Sn} be the set of all combinations in cost
order (Definition 5.4.1). Since S is a successful combination, it would be some Sk
(1 ≤ k ≤ n) in V C. Solutions in SV are evaluated in cost order, from S1 to Sn, and
the first successful combination is selected as minimal. Since we know that S ′ is also
a successful combination, but with a lower cost, it must occur before S in V C (cost
order). However, if S ′ occurs before S then it would be evaluated before S and if
S ′ is a successful combination, it would have been selected as minimal. But S was
selected as minimal. This is a contradiction to our assumption that S ′ exists and has
a lower cost than the selected minimal .
There is no way to predict how many unsuccessful combinations will be evaluated
before a successful one is found, but the hope is that a solution is found before reaching
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the midpoint of the combination list. If successful, this approach would reduce the
number of evaluations by more than 50% over the exhaustive approach.
5.4.2 Low-Cost Selection Heuristic
In this approach, we use heuristics to further reduce the number of evaluations re-
quired to get to a satisfactory low cost (but not necessarily minimal) solution.
Similar to the low-cost selection semi-exhaustive approach, we start by using
ImpactS cost (Definition 5.3.4) to arrange cover combinations in Cost Order, except
in this case we only include full removal combinations. By full removal combinations,
we mean those combination covers that only remove concepts and do not perform
any generalizations. Once in cost order, we can easily determine the lowest cost
of all removal combinations by examining the first combination in the list. The
cost of this first combination becomes our baseline minimum cost. We could select
this combination as our solution and terminate, but to find a “reasonably” low cost
solution, we use heuristics to evaluate a sample of low cost removal combinations
with selected generalizations added. The intuition behind low-cost selection heuristic
approach is that a successful low cost generalization combination is likely based on
a low cost removal combination and by evaluating combination elements based on
entropy, we can balance combination success with minimizing alteration cost and
maximizing data availability. For this approach, we currently only consider one-
level generalizations. There is no reason this approach could not be extended to
consider additional levels of generalization in the future. Note that it not necessary to
evaluate removal combinations since they are based on minimal inference disruption
covers which, by Definition 5.1.3, will disrupt violations by leaving sufficient rules
unsatisfied.
Our method will investigate the lowest cost five removal combinations. In each
case, we know that the removal combination will be successful since it is a minimal
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disruption cover. We also know that generalizing any concept in a removal com-
bination (instead of removing it) will reduce alteration cost. However, the change
from removal to generalization may also cause the combination to not be successful
in disrupting all violations. Therefore, our goal is to carefully pick which concepts in
the removal combination will reduce cost and are most likely to preserve successful
violation disruption.
To assist in selecting concepts that have a higher chance of preserving violation
disruption, we look at concept entropy and the disruption options. Our goal is to
make alterations that leave rules needed by violation inferences unsatisfied. We know
that removal of concepts in these rules will make the rules unsatisfied. However,
for generalization we want to pick concepts that also leave the rules unsatisfied.
Generalizations that are very similar to the original concept are likely to cause fired
rules to remain satisfied; so, we select concepts to generalize by looking at how unlike
they are from the original concept. We use uncertainty as an indicator of “likeness”
between concepts and their generalizations. The more uncertainty that is introduced
by a generalization, the more likely it is dissimilar to the original concept and will
leave a rule unsatisfied (and disrupt inference violations). We are using a threshold of
0.5 uncertainty preserved (uncertainty of removal (1.0) - uncertainty of generalization)
to indicate high dissimilarity and a good choice for generalization.
We first designate the lowest cost removal combination as the current solution and
its cost as the current baseline cost. Next, for each of the lowest cost five removal
combinations in cost order (low to high), we perform the following steps:
• for each participating fact in the removal combination:
– compare the uncertainty introduced by removal with the uncertainty in-
troduced by generalizing one level
– if one level of generalization retains 50% of uncertainty introduced by
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removal, switch alteration method to generalization
• re-calculate cost of combination
• if updated cost of combination is less than the current baseline cost
– apply updated combination alterations to initial database
– reason over database and domain knowledge
– if no violations generated, updated cost is new baseline and updated com-
bination is new current solution
When these steps are complete, we will have evaluated up to five variations on
the lowest cost removal covers. If any of these variations are successful, we will
have captured its cost and marked it as a “reasonably” low cost solution. Since we
do not need to reason over the removal combinations, we will at most reason over
five combinations in this method, making it a much more computationally feasible
approach.
Example 5.4.1 (Heuristic Order). Let there be an Ontology tree as shown in Figure
5.10 with entropy values shown in Table 5.2. Let there be a minimal disruption
cover (removal) combination B with 2 facts linked to ontology concepts C7 and C18.
Let B have alterations A1 and A2 such that A1 removes C7 and A2 removes C18.
Let the safe inference list for C6, and C18 be {b, d, e} and {a, b, c} respectfully. The
information vectors for the data items, alterations, and combination are shown in
Table 5.4.2.
Assume B is the lowest cost combination of the five lowest cost removal combi-
nations. Following the steps described above, the initial baseline Impact cost of B
would be 2 + (2 ∗ 5) = 12.0 (alteration cost + alteration cost * number of safe infer-
ences). When looking at the first alteration, the uncertainty gain is 1.0. Generalizing
C7 one level (C ′7 or C3) would yield an uncertainty gain is 0.5814, which is above our
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threshold of 0.5 (50% reduction), so C7 is a good choice for generalization instead
of removal. Generalizing C18 one level (C ′18 or C6) would yield an uncertainty gain
is 0.3095, which is below our threshold and not a good choice to switch to general-
ization. The updated information vector for B, denoted B′ is shown in 5.4.2. The
Impact cost for the updated combination would be be 1.5 + (1.5 ∗ 5) = 9.0. Assum-
ing B′ removes the violations when applied to the database and reasoned over with
domain knowledge, it would be preferable to B since its Impact cost is lower (9.0
versus 12.0); its uncertainty gain is also lower (1.5814 versus 2.0). The remaining
four low cost combinations would be treated likewise and if any were successful with
an Impact cost lower than 9.0, they would be chosen above B′.
Table 5.4 Initial information vectors for minimal disruption cover (removal)
combination.
Information Vector Alteration Safe Inferences Depth Entropy
Data Item C7 1.0 {a,b,c} 4 0
Data Item CROOT -0.0 1 1
Alteration A1: C7 → CROOT 1.0 {a,b,c} 2.5 1.0
Data Item C18 1.0 {b,d,e} 4 0
Data Item CROOT -0.0 1 1
Alteration A2: C18 → CROOT 1.0 {b,d,e} 2.5 1.0
Combination B = {A1,A2} 2.0 {a,b,c,d,e} 2.5 2.0
Table 5.5 Initial information vectors for minimal disruption cover (removal +
generalization) combination.
Information Vector Alteration Safe Inferences Depth Entropy
Data Item C7 1.0 {a,b,c} 4 0.0
Data Item C3 -0.5 3 0.5814
Alteration A1: C7 → C3 0.5 {a,b,c} 3.5 0.5814
Data Item C18 1.0 {b,d,e} 4 0.0
Data Item CROOT -0.0 1 1.0
Alteration A2: C18 → CROOT 1.0 {b,d,e} 2.5 1.0
Combination B′ = {A1,A2} 1.5 {a,b,c,d,e} 3.0 1.5814
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5.4.3 Low-Cost High-Entropy Traversal
The last area we investigated is based on heuristic construction of a solution versus
selection from a large set of potential solutions. This approach does not require that
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Figure 5.12 Logic graph. This graph is constructed during inference path
evaluation and participant discovery and is used to construct the logic equation for
cover evaluation.
Before describing this approach, we need to discuss an addition to our data model
(Section 3.3.1). A new data structure is added to support the generation of cover logic
strings and low-cost high-entropy traversal method. This additional structure is a
rooted tree graph (Figure 5.12), which is used to store inference paths and their logical
operator connections. The graph has three types of vertices: the collector vertex
which is indicated by a diamond, the inference vertex which is indicted by a circle,
and the fact vertex which is indicated by a square. We will use this inference graph as
a guide to build the cover determination logic statement. In building the statement,
the collector vertex simulates a logical “AND” of its children, the inference vertex
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simulates a logical “OR” of its children, and fact vertices are ground facts / branch
leaves and have no children. We will discuss construction of the rooted tree graph
and logic statement when we review the revised Solution Set and GetCandidates
algorithms in the next section.
We can now describe the low-cost high-entropy traversal method. We use the
violation inference rule representation that is inherent in our rooted tree graph to
guide construction of a minimal inference disruption cover with low cost and high
entropy. By performing a depth-first traversal of the tree graph, we can select the
best node to add into the alteration combination by examining the cost and entropy
of nodes below it.
The idea behind this approach is that, while doing a depth-first traversal of the tree
graph, we build a cover by selecting a node that fulfills the AND and OR requirements
at each logic operator branch. At each OR operator we will select one child item to
satisfy the operation. At each AND operator, we must select all items to satisfy the
operation. Since all nodes are visited using a depth-first traversal, the question of
which items to select for each logic operator is based on nodes already visited. We
use a combination of cost and entropy to select the “best” item for an operator. The
OR operators will pass “up” the selected node and its meta-data, whereas the AND
operator will pass up a set of items and an aggregation of their meta-data. At each
step the options for selection may include: directly connected facts, facts propagated
up the tree by OR operators, or collections of facts assembled and propagated up the
tree by AND operators. By traversing the tree in this way, we can construct a list of
facts that will provide a minimal disruption cover. This list can be confirmed to be
a minimal disruption cover by evaluation using the minimal cover logic statement as
previously discussed.
If we only consider removal cost of fact nodes while traversing, we could easily
























Figure 5.13 This graph is constructed during interrogation of the violations
inference paths. Note the numbers which indicate the order of node visiting during
depth-first traversal.
with the same (lowest) cost as found when ordering removal covers in the previous
section. However, if we looked, not just at removal cost, but factored in a fact node’s
entropy value, our result would be a high-entropy low-cost disruption cover. This
cover would contain facts that, for each OR branch in the graph, are the ones most
likely to preserve disruption if generalized. If we selectively switch the highest entropy
facts in this cover from removal to generalization, our cost should go down and our
probability of preserving disruption should be higher than just selecting the lowest
cost removal cover.
Example 5.4.2 (Tree Graph Traversal). Let the tree graph in Figure 5.13 be a
representation of the rules and participating facts for a set violations. We assume
for this example that all facts in the graph tree have the same impact value. The
low-cost high-entropy traversal would process as follows:
1. The node (A or B) with higher entropy is selected
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2. The node (C or D or F) with higher entropy is selected
3. The results of steps 1 and 2 are combined
4. The node (F or G) with higher entropy is selected
5. The node (H or J) with higher entropy is selected
6. The results of steps 5 and 6 are combined
7. The node (E or K) or result of step 6 with higher entropy is selected
8. The node (J or M or N) with higher entropy is selected
9. The result of steps 3 or 7 or 8 are combined
Details of these approaches are discussed in the following section.
5.5 Efficient Disruption Approach
In this section, we will discuss details and algorithms for the methods needed to
support our efficient approach. Some algorithms in this section are revisions to those
found in Subsection 3.4.1 and some are new.
We have presented numerous revisions to our approach for defeating inference
violations. In the following sections, we provide additional detail with focus on im-
proving computational feasibility. These modifications align with topics presented
earlier in this chapter: reduction of combination set size (Section 5.1), improved cost
evaluation (Section 5.3) and the heuristic approach to quickly selecting a solution
(Section 5.4), with the goal being development of more computationally efficient pro-
cesses. Before presenting relevant algorithm changes, we will describe the high level
logic flow for each of the three approaches described earlier in this chapter.
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First, we describe the flow of Low-Cost Selection Semi-Exhaustive (Section 5.4.1).
The basic logic flow for this approach is similar to that of the exhaustive approach
and shown in Figure 5.14.
Steps are numbered to allow reference to steps in this figure when specific algo-
rithms are discussed. Steps in this flow are as follows:
1. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
2. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
3. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
3a. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
4. This step generates all removal covers. These covers are sorted in cost order,
low to high.
5. In this step, we iterate over all covers, from lowest cost to highest.
5a. In this step, we apply the combination alterations to the original database.
5b. In this step, we reason over the altered database and domain knowledge.
5c. In this step, we check to see if any violations are still present. If no
violations are found, we declare the current combination as the solution
and exit the loop.
6. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
Second, we describe the flow of Low-Cost Selection Heuristic (Section 5.4.2). The
basic logic flow for this approach is similar to that of the exhaustive approach and
shown in Figure 5.15.
The basic logic flow for our efficient approach is similar to that of the exhaustive
approach. Steps are numbered to allow reference to steps in this figure when specific













































Figure 5.14 High-level logic flow of Low-Cost Selection Semi-Exhaustive.
1. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
2. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
3. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
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3a. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
4. This step now only generates full removal covers instead of the full superset of
facts using removal and generalization. These covers are also now sorted in cost
order.
5. The baseline solution is set to the lowest-cost full-removal cover. This will be
our default solution if a lower cost solution is not found.
6. In this step, we iterate over the (up to five) lowest cost removal covers.
6a. In this step, we iterate over all alterations in the cover being processed.
6a1. In this step, we look at the levels of uncertainty (entropy) between a
removal and a generalization. If we maintain 50% of the uncertainty
introduced by removal, we say generalization has a high chance of
maintaining disruption.
6a2. In this step, we switch the alteration from removal to generalization
if the uncertainty threshold has been met.
6b. In this step, we apply the combination alterations to the original database.
6c. In this step, we reason over the altered database and domain knowledge
and check to see if any violations are still present. If no violations are
found, set the altered combination as the new baseline.
7. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
Third, we describe the flow of Low-Cost High-Entropy Traversal (Section 5.4.3).
The basic logic flow for this approach is similar to that of the exhaustive approach
and shown in Figure 5.16.
Steps are numbered to allow reference to steps in this figure when specific algo-
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Figure 5.15 Highlevel logic flow of Low-Cost Selection Heuristic.
1. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
2. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
3. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
3a. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
4. This step generates the minimal cover logic statement and graph tree, but does
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not generate any participating fact combinations.
5. In this step, we do a depth-first traversal of the graph tree to create a cover.
5a. In this step, if an OR operator is encountered, we select the best child
node to propagate up.
5b. In this step, if an AND operator is encountered, we select all child nodes
to propagate up.
6. This step looks at high entropy concepts included in the cover. We start with
all high entropy concepts and remove the lowest valued one until a solution is
reached.
6a. In this step, we generalize all concepts in the current entropy list.
6b. In this step, we test (reason over altered database) and select as solution
if no violations found.
7. This step is the same as in the exhaustive approach.
We now present our “efficient” modification to the exhaustive approach algorithms
and introduce several new algorithms. Algorithm changes for Low-Cost Selection
Semi-Exhaustive are trivial and only consist of processing the combinations in cost
order. We will first present algorithms to support Low-Cost Selection Heuristic,
followed by algorithms to support Low-Cost High-Entropy Traversal.
5.5.1 Low-Cost Selection Heuristic
This discussion will follow the basic flow of Figure 5.15.
The initial algorithm in our framework, Algorithm 1 (DisruptViolations), has a
minor modification. This algorithm implements steps 1-3 and 7 in each of the process
flows.. In Algorithm 1, line 6 is changed to call Algorithm 9 (EfficientDisruption)
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Figure 5.16 High-level logic flow of Low-Cost High-Entropy Traversal.
Next, we address Algorithm 4 (Exhaustive Disruption). This algorithms controls
the primary logic used to find an efficient solution to the violation inference problem.
This algorithm implements steps 4-6 in Figure 5.15.
The revised method, Algorithm 9 (Efficient Disruption) implements the heuristic
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approach described in Section 5.4. Revisions to this algorithm include:
• ContributeToInferenceSet is called to determine the number of inferences each
concept participates in
• EfficientCombinations is called instead of SolutionSet which now returns only
full removal covers
• the set of combinations in SS is sorted in cost order, lowest to highest
• baseline combination (S) and cost (Scost) are established
• up to the first five combinations (cost order) are examined
• in each alteration, removals are changed to generalizations if at least 50% of
removal entropy is retained by generalization
• updated combinations are evaluated if their cost is less than the baseline cost
• if evaluated and violations are removed, updated combination becomes the new
baseline
In general, Algorithm 9 will evaluate generalization options for at most the five
lowest cost removal combinations. It will return either the lowest cost full removal
cover or a generalized version of another low cost removal cover, whichever has lower
cost.
The first step in the EfficientDisruption method is to generate a set of full removal
inference disruption covers. This is analogous to creating the full set of removal and
generalization alteration combinations in the exhaustive approach, but there are two
major differences in theEfficientDisruption method. First, only covers are included
in the returned combination set; if a combination does not impact every violation
inference path at least once, it is not considered a cover. Second, only full removal
covers are returned. At this point in the process, we focus on full removals and
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ALGORITHM 9: EfficientDisruption
Input: DB0 - initial database
Input: DBm - minimal initial database
Input: O - Ontology
Input: v - violation threshold label
Input: λ - privacy mapping function
Input: DBmf - fix point of DBm over O
Input: SV - privacy violating concepts in DBmf
Output: S - selected solution
1 begin
2 ContributeToInferenceSet(DBm,O,DBmf ,SV )
3 SS = EfficientCombinations(DBm,O,DBmf ,SV )
4 sort SS based on combination cost, lowest to hightest
5 sampleSize = min(5,|SS|)
6 S = SS[1]
7 Scost = cost of S
8 for i← 1 to sampleSize do
9 combination = SS[i]
10 forall alteration ∈ combination do
11 o = unaltered RDF triple in alteration
12 r = removal RDF triple in alteration
13 g = 1 level generalization of o
14 threshold = (entropy(O,r)−entropy(O,o))2
15 if (entropy(O, g)− entropy(O, o)) > threshold then
16 update alteration replacing r with g
17 update cost of combination to reflect cost of g
18 end
19 end
20 if updated combination cost < Scost then
21 DBw = AlterData(DB0,combination)
22 DBwf = Reason(DBw,O)
23 C = set of inferred facts from DBwf
24 SV ′ = PrivacyMapAndDetect(C, v, λ)
25 if SV ′ = ∅ then
26 S = alteration







are not including any generalization alterations in the combinations. Algorithm 10
(EfficientCombinations) is a revision of the exhaustive approach SolutionSet method
and implements details in step 4 in Figure 5.15.
Revisions to this algorithm include:
• addition of call to the AddViolationToGraph method to add violation nodes to
the inference graph
• included passing of inference graph (and graph root) to the GetCandidates
method so rule body nodes can be added to the inference graph
• addition of call to the ConstructLogicString to build the cover determination
logic string
• included passing of logic string to the Powerset method to allow for inference
disruption cover testing
The GetCandidates method supports the EfficientCombinations method by re-
cursively interrogating the inference path of a violation’s inference path, finding all
ground facts on that path. Algorithm 11 is a revision of the GetCandidates method.
Revisions to this algorithm include:
• included inference graph (and graph root) as inputs
• addition of call to the AddFactToGraph method to add fact nodes to the infer-
ence graph; these are leaf nodes
• addition of call to the AddInfereceToGraph method to add inference nodes to
the inference graph; this call will add “OR” nodes to simulate a rule body and
“AND” nodes if multiple rules are satisfied and generate the same conclusion
• included passing of inference graph (and graph root) to the recursive GetCan-
didates method so rule body nodes can be added to the inference graph
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ALGORITHM 10: EfficientCombinations
Input: DBm - minimal initial database
Input: O - Ontology
Input: DBmf - fix point of DBm over O
Input: SV - privacy violating concepts in DBmf
Output: SS - powerset of candidate facts
1 P = ∅ // P - remember paths followed
2 C = ∅ // C - candidate list
3 S = “”
4 G = new graph
5 root = create node in G with values: fact NULL, type “AND”
6 forall v ∈ SV do
7 R = all rules satisfied by O and DBm which generates v
8 c = |R|
9 forall r ∈ R do
10 n = AddViolationToGraph (G,root,r,v,c)
11 GetCandidates(DBm,O,DBmf ,r,P ,C,G,n)
12 end
13 end
14 S = ConstructLogicString(G, root, S)
15 CS=Powerset(C,S)
16 return CS
The inference graph data model is constructed in Algorithms 10 and 11 by calls
to the new methods AddViolationToGraph (Algorithm 12), AddInferenceToGraph
(Algorithm 13), and AddFactToGraph (Algorithm 14). Each of these algorithms
adds new paths to the graph such that edges and nodes enable the formation of the
cover evaluations logic string.
Algorithm 12 (new) adds a violation inference to the inference graph. Violations
are always added as children of the root node. Violation inferences are typically
added as an “OR” node, meaning that disruption of any of their children will disrupt
the violation. If there are multiple satisfied rules that can generate the violation
data item (indicated by the rule set cardinality parameter c), then violation inference
“OR” nodes are preceded by an “AND” node. Inclusion of the “AND” node means
that all inference rules generating the violation data item must be disrupted for the
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ALGORITHM 11: GetCandidates (Efficient)
Input: DBm - minimal initial database
Input: O - Ontology
Input: DBmf - fix point of DBm over O
Input: r - rule to follow
Input: P - rules processed
Input: C - Candidates
Input: G - graph
Input: root - root of subgraph in G
Output: C - Updated Candidates
1 F = facts on left side (body) of rule r
2 forall f ∈ F do
3 if f ∈ DBm then
4 f is ground fact
5 n = AddFactToGraph (G,root,r,f ,0)
6 if f /∈ C then
7 h = entropy(O,f)
8 add h to f
9 add f to C // add to candidate list
10 end
11 else
12 f is inferred fact
13 R′ = all rules satisfied by O and DBm which generates f
14 c = |R′|
15 forall r′ ∈ R′ do
16 n = AddInferenceToGraph (G,root,r′,f ,c)
17 if r′ /∈ P then
18 add r′ to P // remember path






24 return C // updated candidate list
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violation inference to be disrupted. The “AND” node is implementing the disruption
container described earlier in our hypergraph approach (see Example 5.2.2).
ALGORITHM 12: AddViolationToGraph
Input: G - graph
Input: root - root of subgraph in G
Input: r - rule
Input: f - fact
Input: c - count of satisfied rules
Output: b - node for rule r, fact f in G
1 if c > 1 then
2 a = node ∈ G with values: fact f , type “AND”
3 if a = NULL then
4 a = create node in G with values: fact f , type “AND”
5 create edge from root to a in G
6 end
7 b = create node in G with values: rule r, fact f , type “OR“
8 create edge from a to b in G
9 else
10 b = create node in G with values: rule r, fact f , type “OR“
11 create edge from root to b in G
12 end
13 return b
Algorithm 13 (new) adds a non-violation inference to the inference graph. Viola-
tions are always added as children to a sub-tree root which can exist in any branch
of the inference tree. These inferences are also typically added as an “OR” node, but
may also be preceded by “AND” nodes if multiple satisfied rules that can generate
the inference data item.
Algorithm 14 (new) adds a ground fact to the inference graph. Facts are always
added as children to a sub-tree root which can exist in any branch of the inference
tree. These nodes are added directly to the parent - there is no need for “OR” or
“AND” nodes.
Algorithm 15 (new) constructs the cover determination logic string. The algorithm
recursively traverses the inference graph. At each node visited, it either creates a
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ALGORITHM 13: AddInferenceToGraph
Input: G - graph
Input: root - root of subgraph in G
Input: r - rule
Input: f - fact
Input: c - count of satisfied rules
Output: n - node for rule r, fact f in G
1 if c > 1 then
2 a = node ∈ G with values: fact f , type “AND”
3 if a = NULL then
4 a = create node in G with values: fact f , type “AND”
5 end
6 create edge in G from root to a
7 b = node ∈ G with values: rule r, fact f , type “OR”
8 if b is null then
9 b = create node in G with values: rule r, fact f , type “OR“
10 end
11 e = edge ∈ G from a to b
12 if e is NULL then
13 create edge in G from a to b
14 end
15 else
16 b = node ∈ G with values: rule r, fact f , type “OR”
17 if b is NULL then
18 b = create node in G with values: rule r, fact f , type “OR“
19 end




Input: G - graph
Input: root - root of subgraph in G
Input: f - fact
1 b = node ∈ G with values: fact f , type “FACT”
2 if b is NULL then
3 b = create node in G with values: fact f , type “FACT“
4 end
5 e = edge ∈ G from root to b
6 if e is NULL then
7 create edge in G from root to b
8 end
104
binary “AND” expression, a binary “OR” expression or inserts a ground fact label.
To maintain appropriate precedence, expressions are contained within parentheses.
The logic statement for the inference graph in Figure 5.12 can be seen at the bottom
of that figure.
ALGORITHM 15: ConstructLogicString
Input: G - Graph
Input: root - root of subgraph in G
Input: currString - Logic String
Output: S - Logic String
1 S = currString
2 a = node at root
3 case type value for a do
4 case “AND” do
5 S = S + “(”
6 C = list of children for a
7 forall c ∈ C do
8 S = ConstructLogicString(G,c,S)
9 S = S + “ ∧ ”
10 end
11 S = S + “ 1 )”
12 end
13 case “OR” do
14 S = S + “(”
15 C = list of children for a
16 forall c ∈ C do
17 S = ConstructLogicString(G,c,S)
18 S = S + “ | ”
19 end
20 S = S + “ 0 )”
21 end
22 case “FACT” do




Algorithm 16 (new) determines if a given participant fact combination is a cover
for the identified inference violations. For this method, a cover is defined as the facts
in list C that positionally correspond to bits set to 1 in the binary string in variable
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b, the binary representation of the combination. The value of the cover participating
facts are set to “1” in the logic string, all others are set to “0”. A bitwise evaluation
is then performed on the logic string which returns a boolean result. If the result is
“TRUE” the combination is a cover, if “FALSE”, it is not.
ALGORITHM 16: TestForCover
Input: S - Logic String
Input: C - Participating Fact List
Input: b - binary representation of combination to test
Output: cover - boolean
1 q = |C|
2 for k = 0 to q do
3 set all instances of C[k] in S to b[k]
4 end
5 cover = bitwise evaluation of logic string S
6 return cover
Algorithm 17 is a revision of the Powerset method (previously called Quaternary-
Powerset). The primary modification to this algorithm is to only construct removal
combinations that are covers. We are not constructing combinations that contain
generalizations. Revisions to this algorithm include:
• change from quaternary (base 4) counting to binary (base 2) counting; we only
have two states, do nothing or remove
• test each removal combination to determine if it provides a cover; ignore if it
does not
• only build removal combinations based on verified covers; remove code for build-
ing generalization combinations
Algorithm 18 (new) is a generic bit adder. The adder uses the value of t as its
base number system adding 1 to the binary representation of an integer stored in
the elements of the array b[ ]. This algorithm is used by Algorithm 17 to build
combinations.
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ALGORITHM 17: Powerset (Efficient)
Input: C - Candidates
Input: S - Logic String
Output: CS - Combination Set
1 t = 2 // do binary counting
2 q = |C| // candidate list size
3 b[0 . . . q − 1] = 0 // initialize bit mask
4 p=tq // number of combinations
5 for i = 0 to p do
6 b[ ] = BitAdder(b[ ],t)
7 cover = TestForCover(S,C,b)
8 if cover then
9 new combination with combinationCost = 0
10 for k = 0 to q do
11 if b[k] > 0 then include fact k
12 new alteration with alterationCost = 0
13 alteration source data item = C[k]
14 altered target data item = root concept from ontology O
15 add 1.0 to alterationCost add alteration to combination








Input: b[ ] - Candidate Bit Indicators
Input: t - Adder Base
Output: b[ ] - Candidate Bit Indicators + 1
1 add 1 to b[0] // add base t
2 for j = 0 to t do
3 if b[j] < t then
4 exit inner loop // no carry digit
5 else
6 b[j] = 0




The remaining algorithms support enhancements to our cost calculations. These
algorithms collect meta-data about concepts, alterations, and combinations. The
data is stored and aggregated in information vectors as described in Section 5.3. This
meta-data includes alteration cost, inference participation count, and entropy value.
Algorithm 19 determines the number of inferences a concept participates in.
Counts are tracked separately for participation in safe violations and violation in-
ference. This method generates the counts by following the inference path for each
satisfied inference rule in the database. For each rule generating an inference, Al-
gorithm 20 is called to recursively traverse the rule’s inference path. During this
traversal, counts are incremented as ground facts in rule bodies on the inference
paths are discovered. The algorithms differentiate between counting authorized and
unauthorized inferences by declaring a traversal as safe (FALSE) or unsafe/violation
(TRUE) in call to the ContributionToInferenceConcept method.
ALGORITHM 19: ContributionToInferenceSet
Input: DB - minimal initial database
Input: O - Ontology
Input: DBmf - fix point of DBm over O
Input: SV - security violation list
1 begin
2 R = rules over O inferring conclusions in DBmf
3 forall r ∈ R do
4 c = conclusion of r
5 if c ∈ SV then
6 ContributionToInferenceConcept (DBm, TRUE, r, R)
7 else




The last meta-data element needed for our information vector is the concept’s
uncertainty or entropy value. The entropy calculation is based on the work of Calmet
and Daemi [5]; they calculate a concept’s entropy based on uncertainty that the
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ALGORITHM 20: ContributionToInferenceConcept
Input: DBm - minimal initial database
Input: v - violation indicator for c
Input: r - rule to process
Input: R - set of rules
1 begin
2 C = concepts in body of rule r
3 forall c ∈ C do
4 if c ∈ DB then






11 r′ = rule in R that concludes c




concept is or is not actually one of its sub-concepts. In our approach, entropy is
calculated by Algorithm 21 (ConceptEntropy). This algorithm first determines the
degree of a concept (the number of sub-concepts under it in the ontology hierarchy
tree) using Algorithm 22. The concept degree, along with the cardinality of the
ontology, is then used by Algorithm 21 to calculate h, the entropy of concept c.
ALGORITHM 21: ConceptEntropy
Input: O - ontology
Input: c - concept (constant string)
Output: h - concept entropy of c
1 begin
2 M = ∅
3 g = |O|
4 d = ConceptDegree(O, c,M)
5 d̂ = (d
g
)










Algorithm 22 interrogates the ontology tree using localized traversal to determine
a given concept’s degree. We define degree as the number of children under a concept
in the ontology’s ‘ISA’ hierarchy tree.
ALGORITHM 22: ConceptDegree
Input: c - concept
Input: O - ontology
Input: M - working list
Output: d - degree
1 begin
2 A = facts ∈ O matching (∗,‘ISA’, c)
3 d = 1
4 forall a ∈ A do
5 ĉ = subject component of fact in a
6 if a /∈M then
7 add a to M





5.5.2 Low-Cost High-Entropy Traversal
This discussion will follow the basic flow of Figure 5.16.
We first make a few trivial modifications to existing algorithms. In Algorithm 10,
we remove the call to the Powerset method (Algorithm 17). We also alter Algorithms
10 and 15 to pass back the rooted tree graph G instead of the combination list SS.
Next, we modify Algorithm 9 to used the above modified algorithms along with
Algorithm 24 (which will be discussed next). We present the modified version of
Algorithm 9 as Algorithm 23.
Lastly, we present Algorithm 24, which builds the low-cost high-entropy inference
disruption cover discussed in Section 5.4.3. The algorithm is recursive starting with
the root node of the tree graph and performing a depth-first traversal of all nodes.
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ALGORITHM 23: EfficientDisruptionTraversal
Input: DB0 - initial database
Input: DBm - minimal initial database
Input: O - Ontology
Input: v - violation threshold label
Input: λ - privacy mapping function
Input: DBmf - fix point of DBm over O
Input: SV - privacy violating concepts in DBmf
Output: S - selected solution
1 begin
2 e = 0.5 // entropyThreshold
3 z = 5 // sampleSize
4 ContributeToInferenceSet(DBm,O,DBmf ,SV )
5 G = EfficientCombinations(DBm,O,DBmf ,SV ) // modified
6 (S,E) = TraverseForCover(G)
7 P = highest entropy z concepts in S with entropy > e
8 found = false
9 while (P != ∅) AND (found = false) do
10 M = combination based on remove (P − S) and generalize S
11 DBw = AlterData(DB0,M)
12 DBwf = Reason(DBw,O)
13 C = set of inferred facts from DBwf
14 SV ′ = PrivacyMapAndDetect(C, v, λ)
15 if SV ′ = ∅ then
16 found = true
17 else
18 Remove lowest entropy concept from P
19 end
20 end
21 if found then






Input: n - node
Output: S - cover list
Output: E - cost of S
1 begin
2 if n is an AND node then
3 S = ""
4 E = 0
5 forall c, child of n do
6 (s,e) = TraverseForCover(c)
7 S = S + s
8 E = E + e
9 end
10 end
11 if n is an OR node then
12 S = ""
13 E = max integer
14 forall c, child of n do
15 (s,e) = TraverseForCover(c)
16 if e < E then
17 S = s




22 if n is an FACT node then
23 S = fact





When visiting each node of the tree, the appropriate action will be taken depending
on if the node type is “AND”, “OR”, or “FACT”. Collections of selected facts and
aggregated cost information are passed back to the recursive calls for construction of
the final low-cost high-entropy cover. This algorithm will always return a minimal
removal disruption cover with the highest entropy facts found. The cover returned
is also the most likely cover to have facts generalized and still provide disruption. In
this context, minimal is based on potential to be generalized and preserve violation
disruption (higher entropy).
5.6 Efficient Approach Empirical Results
We initially enhanced our prototype implementation to include the low-cost selection
methods introduced in this chapter. Given that the low-cost selection semi-exhaustive
approach (Section 5.4.1) still showed potential for requiring a large number of evalua-
tions, we only tested and reported results on the low-cost selection heuristic approach
(Section 5.4.2). To evaluate the impact of the low-cost selection methods on com-
putational efficiency, we tested the updated prototype using the same tests and data
sets that were used for evaluation of our exhaustive model. The results of our execu-
tions are shown in Table 5.6. This table takes the exhaustive results from Chapter 4
and adds data from our efficient executions. Since, for this evaluation, we are only
concerned with overall system performance, we remove the Load, Reason, Discover,
and Evaluate timing columns. Columns to show the number of disruption covers
found and the total execution time for the efficient model were added. Rows are still
arranged into three groups based on the number of privacy violations known to exist
(0, 1, 2, or 4). Within each group, we provide five files based on patient counts in the
file (100, 500, 1000, 2500, and 5000). In each test execution, the expected violations
were identified and proper privacy labels applied. A valid solution with minimal cost
was found and reported for each test execution.
113
Table 5.6 Prototype execution summary with efficient methods timing collected











































































100 369 376 745 0 0 0 0 745 550 26%
500 1741 1806 3547 0 0 0 0 926 744 20%
1000 3456 3592 7048 0 0 0 0 1019 961 6%
2500 8596 8947 17543 0 0 0 0 1387 1380 1%
5000 17168 17875 35043 0 0 0 0 1952 2026 -4%
100 403 414 817 1 3 63 7 1744 3011 -73%
500 1904 1983 3887 1 3 63 7 3193 3389 -6%
1000 3779 3941 7720 1 3 63 7 4617 3717 19%
2500 9400 9811 19211 1 3 63 7 9707 4836 50%
5000 18777 19606 38383 1 3 63 7 18189 6311 65%
100 404 417 821 2 6 4095 49 22593 3875 83%
500 1905 1986 3891 2 6 4095 49 81837 4431 95%
1000 3780 3944 7724 2 6 4095 49 164497 5197 97%
2500 9401 9814 19215 2 6 4095 49 444847 6051 99%
5000 18778 19609 38387 2 6 4095 49 929728 8697 99%
100 403 414 817 4 10 1048575 637 3691252 7708 >100%
500 1904 1983 3887 4 10 1048575 637 18357303 7564 >100%
1000 3779 3941 7720 4 10 1048575 637 33996151 8423 >100%
2500 9400 9811 19211 4 10 1048575 637 74869826 8741 >100%
5000 18777 19606 38383 4 10 1048575 637 148965619 10485 >100%
As seen in the Table 5.6, execution time was reduced dramatically by using the
low-cost selection heuristic methods from this chapter. In our exhaustive approach,
the number of fact modifying combinations needing to be tested was based on the
list of participating facts modified three ways (removal, one level of generation, two
levels of generation). This equated to (4p − 1) fact modifying combinations, where
t is the size of the participating facts size. With our modifications, we initially only
look at removal inference covers which do not need to be tested. We then only need
test a small set of the lowest cost covers to see if generalization will decrease their
cost.
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As can be seen in Figure 5.17, timing for all test runs using the modified prototype
barely exceeds 10 seconds (10000 ms). When compared to the timing graph for the
exhaustive approach (Figure 4.4), the total execution times of the efficient method
prototype decreased by several orders of magnitude over the prototype using the
exhaustive approach. This is attributable to the drastic drop in the number of times









































Figure 5.17 Prototype execution timing for execution using efficient methods.
Trend lines show execution time (log) in milliseconds. Individual line corresponds to
number of violations found in data instance.
Comparing specific violation data set tests for each prototype, we can see that
efficiencies are gained as the participating fact count (driven by violation count)
increases. For the group of data sets with no violations, the execution times are very
similar (Figure 5.18). A small amount of overhead was added when interrogating
inference paths to support generation of covers, this overhead quickly diminishes as
the data sets size increases.





































Exhaustive - 0 Violations
Efficient - 0 Violations
Figure 5.18 Prototype execution timing for 0 violation data sets. Trend lines show
execution time (log) in milliseconds. Individual line corresponds to number of
violations found in data instance.
become apparent (Figure 5.19). For this group of data sets, the exhaustive approach
had to evaluate 63 combinations. The efficient approach identified seven covers and
reached a 65% performance increase on the 5000 fact dataset.
The data sets containing two violations show a much larger increase in perfor-
mance (Figure 5.20). For this group of data sets, the exhaustive approach had to
evaluate 4095 combinations. The efficient approach identified 49 covers and reached
a 99% performance increase on the 5000 fact dataset.
Lastly, the data sets containing four violations are shown in Figure 5.20. For
the 5000 fact data set, the exhaustive approach had to evaluate 1,048,575 alteration
combinations and required approximately 40 hours to complete. The efficient ap-
proach identified 637 covers and completed in approximately 10 seconds. While we
have relaxed our minimality property by not testing every possible combination of





































Exhaustive - 1 Violation
Efficient - 1 Violation
Figure 5.19 Prototype execution timing for 1 violation data sets. Trend lines show
execution time (log) in milliseconds. Individual line corresponds to number of
violations found in data instance.






































Exhaustive - 2 Violations
Efficient - 2 Violations
Figure 5.20 Prototype execution timing for 2 violation data sets. Trend lines show
execution time (log) in milliseconds. Individual line corresponds to number of









































Exhaustive - 4 Violations
Efficient - 4 Violations
Figure 5.21 Prototype execution timing for 4 violation data sets. Trend lines show
execution time (log) in milliseconds. Individual line corresponds to number of




In our initial work, we considered privacy violations to be generated data items that
exceed the authorization level of the intended recipient. The privacy labels used to
determine a violation are based on the common regulatory privacy rules and protocols
found in healthcare (i.e., HIPAA). In this section, we investigate other domains that
may influence the privacy authorization and the release of data.
We consider the following:
• Personal Concerns - Patients may have personal reasons for not wanting par-
ticular data items to be released. A patient’s concerns may apply to both data
in the initial data set (intended release) as well as data inferred using domain
knowledge (unintended release), but we only address the unintended release of
information in this work.
• Safety Concerns - Clinicians, or other subject matter experts, may feel that
the suppression (generalization or removal) of certain data items create safety
concerns for the patient. Released data may be used to treat a patient, evaluate
their condition, recommend a treatment or medication, or determine if they pose
a population health risk. Reducing data availability could negatively impact an
assessment in each of these areas. In these cases, violations with related safety
concerns may need to be left intact even though they generate a violation. Since
the violation will persist, the privacy label of the data set should be elevated to
the appropriate level to coincide with the permitted violations.
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We will develop methods to incorporate personal and safety concerns in our vio-
lation evaluation and data release process. The new labels introduced by this work
will be captured and stored with existing meta-data and considered when calculating
alteration cost (see Section 5.3). There may be cases where the Safety or Privacy
label of a data item either requires or prohibits the modification of a data item; in
other cases, the label may influence a solution containing that data item by increasing
or decreasing its cost. Data to support these scenarios will all be captured in the cost
vector discussed in Section 5.3.
6.1 Privacy - Patient Preference
In our heuristic approach to disrupting violation inferences, we either remove a data
item or generalize it. We try to minimize the number of data items that are altered,
but there may be cases where removal or generalization of a specific data item is
desired. We envision several use cases where a patient requests that certain data
items not be released without modification. To accommodate these use cases, we
would provide the ability for a patient to provide a preference indicator for any data
item they are concerned about being released without modification. We propose the
patient be presented with a sliding scale of values (0, . . . , 3) to represent the degree
of patient preference to be considered in the inference disruption process (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Patient preference value indicates the level of requirement that
something should not be released.
Safety Degree Meaning
0 Fine With Releasing
1 Prefer To Not Be Released
2 Should Not Be Released
3 Must Not Be Released
The patient preference value would be added to the data item information vector
(Definition 5.3.1) for each fact in the patient’s data. Any data items that do not
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have patient preference values specified would default to 0. The value in the data
item information vectors would be aggregated in the combination information vector
(Definition 5.3.3) for each combination cover. When placing the combinations in cost
order, (Definition 5.4.1) we alter the calculation of ImpactS (Definition 5.3.4) to sub-
tract the aggregate patient preference value from the impact value. This subtraction
will cause combinations containing data items that the patient has indicated concern
over to be given a lower cost, making them more likely to be part of the the chosen
solution. There is no guarantee that a patient’s preference request will be honored,
but since it reduces cost, its selection will be more seen as more desirable by the
framework.
6.2 Safety
In the patient preference section, we strive to ensure a data item is altered if possible,
but there may also be cases where a data custodian wants to ensure that a data item
be released unaltered (or minimally altered). We envision use cases where certain data
items need to be released “as-is” with no modification (removal or generalization).
These cases could include data requirements in policies, protocols, or regulations.
There could also be clinical safety reasons where altering the data may not be in the
best medical interest of the patient. Cases may also exist where release of specific
data is needed by first responders or clinicians for emergency medicine situations. We
refer to these scenarios collectively as safety use cases. To accommodate the safety
use cases, we propose an additional sliding scale of values (0, . . . , 3) to represent the
degree of patient safety to be considered in the inference disruption process (Table
6.2)..
The safety value would be added to the data item information vector (Definition
5.3.1) for each fact in the patient’s data. Any data items that do not have safety pref-
erence values specified would default to 0. During the collection of violation inference
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Table 6.2 Safety values indicate the level of requirement that something must be
released.
Safety Degree Meaning
0 Fine With Not Releasing
1 Prefer To Be Released
2 Should Be Released
3 Must Be Released
path participating facts (Algorithm 11), line 6 would be altered to ignore any facts
that have a safety value of 5. This ensures that data items which the custodian has
indicated “must be released” are not considered for removal or generalization. Facts
found on violation inference paths with safety values less than 3 are added to the
participating fact. Their inclusion is not guaranteed, but prioritized as follows. The
safety values in data item information vectors would be aggregated in the combina-
tion information vector (Definition 5.3.3) for each combination cover as with patient
preference. When placing the combinations in cost order, (Definition 5.4.1) we alter
the calculation of ImpactS calculation (Definition 5.3.4) to add the aggregate safety
value to the impact value. This addition will cause combinations containing data
items that the custodians have indicated concern over altered release to be given a
higher cost, making them more likely to not be the chosen solution. There is no
guarantee that a safety request (less than 3) will be honored, but since it increases
cost, its selection will be more seen as less desirable by the framework.
6.3 Privacy & Safety Approach
Information Vector
In this section, we provide modification to the information vector described in 5.3. To
support safety and patient preference, we introduce new meta-data in the information
vector. This information will be used to refine the combination cost calculations. We
still maintain the generic form of this vector for modification at three levels:
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1. meta-data is tracked at the individual data item level
2. meta-data is tracked in aggregate for unaltered and altered data items (data
item alteration)
3. meta-data is tracked in aggregate for the set of alterations (alteration combi-
nation)
We re-define Definitions 5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3 to accommodate the safety and
privacy concepts as follows:
Definition 6.3.1 (Enhanced Data Item Information Vector). Let f be a data item.
We say the data item information vector for f , Vf =< a1, . . . , a6 >, is a set of
attributes, such that a1 is the alteration cost associated with f , a2 is the list of
distinct unsafe inferences that f participates in, a3 is the ontology hierarchy depth
of f , and a4 is the entropy (uncertainty) of f . a5 is the safety level setting of f . a6
is the patient preference level setting of f .
Definition 6.3.2 (Enhanced Alteration Information Vector). Let m be a data item
alteration, with source concept c1 and target concept c2. We say the alteration
information vector for m, Vm =< a1, . . . , a6 >, is a set of attributes, such that a1 is
the sum of alteration cost associated with data items in a, a2 is a 2-tuple where the
first element is a distinct list of safe inferences for c1 and the second element a similar
list for c2, a3 is the average ontology hierarchy depths for c1 and c2, and a4 is the
difference between the entropy for c1 and c2, (c2 − c1). a5 is the safety level setting
of c1. a6 is the patient preference level setting of c1.
Definition 6.3.3 (Enhanced Combination Information Vector). Let c be a set of
alterations forming a PFC. We say the combination information vector for c, Vc =<
a1, . . . , a6 >, is a set of attributes, such that a1 is the sum of alteration cost asso-
ciated for all alterations in c, a2 is a 2-tuple where each element is a union of the
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corresponding element for all alterations in c, a3 is the average ontology hierarchy
depth for all alterations in c, and a4 is the sum of the entropy values for all alterations
in c. a5 is the safety level setting of f . a6 is the patient preference level setting of f .
a5 is the sum of the safety level setting for all alterations in c. a6 is the sum of the
patient preference level setting for all alterations in c.
Alteration Impact
To accommodate patient preference and safety requests, we enhance the calculation
of ImpactS the alteration impact of a PFC.
Definition 6.3.4 (Enhanced Alteration Impact Value). The alteration impact value,
denoted ImpactS, is the alteration cost CostS enhanced by the number of safe
inferences impacted, patient preference, and safety values. Let S be a PFC, U the
number of safe inferences disrupted by S, P the patient preference value, and V the
safety value. We calculate the alteration impact value of S as follows: ImpactS =
CostS + (CostS ∗ U)− P + V .
Exclusion from Cover
To ensure that data items indicated by the data custodian as “must be released”
(safety value of 3), we modifiy Algorithm 11, line 6 from “If f /∈ C” to “if f /∈ C
and f safetyValue 6= 3”. This change will ensure that data items marked with a safety
value of 3 are not included in the participant list and not a fact in disruption covers.
Example 6.3.1 (Privacy:Patient Preference & Safety). Let there be an Ontology
tree as shown in Figure 5.10 with entropy values shown in Table 5.2. Let Figure
6.1 show a rule that was satisfied by C4, C6, C7 and generated the privacy violation
V1. Let C4, C6, C7 have patient preference and safety values as shown in Table 6.3.
When constructing the list of violation participating facts, only C4 and C7 would be
included; fact C6 would not be included on the list since its safety value is set to 3.
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Lastly, let there be a participating fact combination C, as shown in Table 6.3, with
two facts linked to ontology concepts C6 and C7 with alterations A1 and A2 such
that A2 generalizes C6 one level to C2 and A1 generalizes C7 two levels to C1. The
ImpactS value for C1 would be ImpactC1 = 1.25 + (1.25 ∗ 5)− 2 + 1, which is 6.5.








Figure 6.1 Multi-identity nature of concepts when they are potential targets for
generalization or removal.
Table 6.3 Information Vectors - table shows data item information vectors.
Information Vector Safe Inferences Depth Entropy Patient Preference Safety
Data Item C7 {a,b,c} 4 0 0 1
Data Item C4 {b,d,e} 2 0.4138 3 3
Data Item C6 {a,b} 3 0.3095 2 0
Table 6.4 Information Vectors - table shows data item, alteration, and
combination information vectors.
Information Vector Alteration Safe Inferences Depth Entropy Privacy Safety
Data Item C7 1.0 {a,b,c} 4 0 0 1
Data Item C1 -0.25 {b,d,e} 2 0.8524
Alteration A1: C7 → C1(C ′′7 ) 0.75 ({a,b,c},{b,d,e}) 3 0.8524 0 1
Data Item C6 1.0 {a,b} 3 0.3095 2 0
Data Item C2 -0.5 {b,c,d} 2 0.6500
Alteration A2: C6 → C2(C ′6) 0.5 ({a,b},{b,c,d}) 2.5 0.3405 2 0
Combination C1 = {A1,A2} 1.25 ({a,b,c},{b,c,d,e}) 2.75 1.1929 2 1
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6.4 Privacy & Safety Empirical Results
We ran experiments using the new cost function presented in this chapter. Our
empirical results, with respect to privacy, safety and security, support our claim
that these requirements can be seamlessly integrated into the PIA framework. The





Up to this point, our privacy evaluation and modification process has been static.
Rules are established in advance based on what data custodians or patients “think”
they are willing to release. There is no feedback during the process or a way for
custodians or patients to see “what if” scenarios in relation to what data might be
generated and released.
People trust systems and presume that their information is safe. They assume that
data they do not want released, will not be. In most cases, people understand neither
what data was collected on them nor what release of that data would imply; much
less what could be inferred from this data when reasoned over along with domain
knowledge.
We will investigate the design and development of a user-friendly graphical user
interface (GUI) prototype that would allow a data custodian or patient to under-
stand in advance the privacy aspects of healthcare data being released and what
can be inferred from that data. The GUI prototype leverages services from our PIA
framework (see Figure 7.1). This prototype would reason over a patient’s data and
show items, both existing and generated, along with identified privacy levels. Since
patient records are becoming voluminous, we would only show data identified as vi-
olations, but allow for “drill down” to access other data items. The intent would not
be casual browsing of patient records, but rather identification of data items that are
potential violations (privacy, personal, or safety).
























Figure 7.1 Graphical User Interface integration with the PIA framework.
an attacker might leverage data items to their advantage.
Lastly, the GUI prototype would allow the user to set personal preferences for
release of their data. These preferences would be included in the extended privacy
model (Chapter 6).
7.1 High-Level Design
The user interface of our GUI prototype is constrained to one window with launching
of external viewers for additional information content (PDF, web pages, videos). The
interface consists of a tool bar along the left edge of the window and a primary viewing
area (see Figure 7.2).
Buttons on the tool bar provide functions that trigger various actions: review in-
formation / tutorials, load patient data, discover new information, provide program

























Figure 7.2 Graphical User Interface. Basic display layout.
viewing area provides a panel that is context-aware and displays the selected infor-
mation. The initial implementation has functions to display various types of reference
information, allow viewing of a dynamic ontology tree (tree is enhanced with data
loaded and inferred from reasoning), patient preference management, and a list of
common reasons for data release. Additional functions may be easily added as well
as additional information content.
The high-level functions associated with each the buttons on the toolbar are as
follows:
• “Privacy and Knowledge Information ” - When this button is selected, the user














Description and overview of topic area
Topic
Description and overview of topic area
Topic
Description and overview of topic area
Topic
Description and overview of topic area
Figure 7.3 Graphical User Interface. Description of tutorials and reference
material areas with button to access information.
(see Figure 7.3). The four information categories are: “Data Privacy Reg-
ulations”, “Consent Information”, “Healthcare Institution Information”, and
“Healthcare Domain Knowledge”. Each category has a narrative description
along with a button to “Learn More”. Clicking the “Learn More” button will
launch a category-specific window with buttons to access additional content.
Currently each of the categories has three content buttons. These buttons may
be programmed to display content from PDF files, web pages, or videos. They
may also bring up a application generated display in the main viewing area.
Most content is currently displayed by launching content-specific native view-
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ers for the content type.
• “Places your Data is Sent” - When this button is selected, the user is presented
with a table giving information on typical types of data sets released from a
healthcare facility, the reason that data is released, who within the healthcare
facility is responsible for the release, and what agency / entity it is released to.
There is also an explanation of accountability of disclosure and what it means
to the patient.
• “Load Patient Data” - When this button is selected, an ontology diagram is
displayed (see Figure 7.4). There is initially no patient data incorporated in
the diagram and no inferred data is shown. The user is presented a load file
dialog. Once a file is selected, patient data is loaded and the ontology diagram
updated to show patient data incorporated as additional facts (vertices with
edges to show relationships to ontology concepts). The ontology diagram is an
active graph – clicking on a node or vertex will instantiate a popup window
that gives a brief explanation of the data item.
• “Discover Information” - When this button is selected, the ontology diagram is
updated to incorporate any generated data coming from the inference process
along with appropriate relationships to patient data and ontology concepts. If
the patient data has not been loaded, the user is prompted to load patient
data before running discover information. Any data items identified as privacy
violations will be colored red and all participation facts will be colored yel-
low. Additional nodes and vertices on the ontology graph are activated to give
explanations if selected.
• “Patient Privacy Preferences” - When this button is selected, the ontology di-
agram with patient data incorporated will be shown. If patient has not been








Medical Data Domain Knowledge
Figure 7.4 Graphical User Interface. Initial view of the ontology with no data
loaded or inferred.
facts that have had their preference previously set will be shown. Previous
preferences are ready from a file at the time of patient data load. User will have
the option to set or change preferences and save information.
• “About” – When this button is selected, an informational window is displayed
that provides application information.
• “Exit” - Selecting the exit button will exit the application.
The GUI prototype is a stand-alone application, but leverages services from the
PIA framework (see Figure 7.1). Since both applications are developed in Java, the
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GUI interface is able to access all PIA public methods by including the framework
prototype package when being compiled. As shown in the diagram, PIA services are
leveraged at several points in the GUI workflow. When ontologies and patient data
are loaded, GUI utilizes the PIA functions that support instance database and domain
knowledge loading. When we discover new information in the GUI, we utilize the PIA
functions that manage privacy policy, reason over patient data and domain knowledge
and detect security violations. Lastly, PIA and GUI share the same patient preference
files. These files are also used by PIA to determine cost, which drives construction of
minimal disruption covers. The GUI also uses PIA output to make patient preference
suggestions.
Once GUI prototype application has been started, use cases are as follows:
• View Information - PDF file, Webpage, Video or application generated content
– Select "Privacy and Knowledge Information" button on toolbar
– Main viewing area updated to show content topics
– Press “More Information” button in Main Viewing Area corresponding to
desired content
– A window with content options will be presented. Select the desired con-
tent.
– External viewer will be launched or main viewing area content changed
– Video will start playing or static content will be displayed
– Close external viewer (if launched) when finished
• Review places data may be sent
– Select “Places Your Data is Sent” button tab on toolbar
– Main viewing area is updated to show table of common places patient data
is sent
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• Load Patient Data
– Select “Load Patient Information” button tab on toolbar
– Press Load Data button in toolbar
– Select Patient data file
– Ontology is automatically updated to show patient data
• Discovered Data
– Load Patient Data (above)
– Select “Discover Information” button tab on toolbar
– Ontology is shown and automatically updated to show generated data and
violations
• Patient Privacy Preferences
– Load Patient Data (above)
– Select “Patient Privacy Preferences” button tab on toolbar
– Main viewing area is updated to ontology with patient data incorporated
– Suggested preference setting colored green
– Current preferences colored yellow
– Select relationship (graph edge) to update preference on patient data (not
the ontology)
– Select save to store preferences
• Prototype Application
– Press the “About the Application” button on the toolbar
– Information about the application will be displayed in a popup window
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• Exit the application
– Press the “Exit” button on the toolbar
– Confirm exit
7.2 Prototype Implementation
The GUI prototype implementation is an extension of the Java project used for the
PIA efficient framework prototype from Chapter 5. Separate Java packages were
created to hold components of the prototype. We approached the GUI design using
a Model View Controller (MVC) architecture, each being a separate Java package in
the project.
• The model package manages all data. Data structures are built to hold patient,
ontology and reference information. This package also managed the interface
with the efficient framework for data loading, model rendering, and inference
discovery / path interrogation.
• The view package manages all graphical aspects of the prototype. The proto-
type’s primary window is divided up into a row of buttons and an information
frame. Buttons are used to load and discover information as well as provide
version information and exit the prototype. Panels in the main display area are
used to display reference information as well as provide a view of the ontology
graph and impact of the ontology and inference process. All graph vertices and
edges are active and provide information when selected.
• The controller manages provides a generic interface between the model and view
packages. This allows each package to communicate with the other without
having to understand its methods.
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We use the Java Swing libraries to construct the visual components of the prototype.
The Java package mxGraph (JGraphX) [20] is used to manage and render the ontol-
ogy graph. Vertices and edges are managed as objects so they can be expanded as
data is loaded and reasoning is performed.
Selected screen shots from execution of the GUI prototype are show as follows:
• Figure 7.5 shows the initial screen displayed at startup. This screen is linked
to the Privacy and Knowledge Information button on the toolbar
• Figure 7.6 shows a loaded ontology. All vertices and edges are active and provide
additional information if clicked.
• Figure 7.7 shows the loaded ontology once data has been loaded and reasoning
performed.
• Figure 7.9 shows a table of sample destinations that patient data may be sent
to.
• Figure 7.9 shows the loaded ontology with patient data. Patient preferences are
indicated and patients can update the preference values.
7.3 Patient Reference Information
Part of the objective of the GUI prototype is to provide patients with information
on various privacy aspects of their healthcare data. We envision this data describing
three topic ares: US National and State privacy regulations, various types of patient
consent, and local healthcare facility privacy policy and associated research rules.
We have included samples of information from these three areas in the GUI proto-
type. When possible, we are using hyperlinks to pull in active content. This reduces
maintenance, provides the most up-to-date information, and makes sure we do not
misinterpret an agency’s official stand on patient privacy. When active content is not
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Figure 7.5 Graphical User Interface. View of educational information.
available, we construct sample content based on information from discussions with
healthcare data analysts responsible for release of information and accountability of
disclosure activities. Non-active content is shown only as a sample of what could be
presented and is the author’s best-effort collection of data from several sources. This
information is not intended to be authoritative or complete and may not reflect the
letter of the law, regulation, or policy. All data sources should be edited for content
and appropriate reading levels before being released to the general public. The fol-
lowing information is representative of relevant content and is “linked to” in the GUI
prototype:
• US National Healthcare Data Privacy
– Easy-to-read fact sheet entitled “Your health information privacy rights”
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Figure 7.6 Graphical User Interface. Initial view of ontology with no data loaded
or inferred.
– An infographic entitled “Your Health Information, Your Rights”
– Video on “Individual’s Rights under HIPAA to Access their Health Infor-
mation”
• Patient Consent
– Web content on “Meaningful Consent”
– Health Information Exchange - “Opt In Opt Out” Video
– Web content on “Informed Consent for Human Research"
• Healthcare Facility -
– example notice of privacy practices overview
– example notice of privacy practices agreement
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Figure 7.7 Graphical User Interface. View of ontology with patient data loaded
and inferred.
– IRB policies and procedures
• Healthcare Domain Knowledge
– Information on domain knowledge and reasoning. Examples given to help
understand the semantic reasoning process.
– Information on the inference problems and how this process can generate
undesired inferences. Examples of the type of information that can be
generated and ways that information can be used against them.
– Presentation of a sample ontology graph that can be explored by drilling
down on vertices and edges.
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Figure 7.8 Graphical User Interface. View of places a healthcare facility may send
your data.
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Figure 7.9 Graphical User Interface. View of ontology with preference selector
active for a relation.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions & Future Research
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we investigate privacy violations occurring when non-confidential
patient data is combined with medical domain ontologies to disclose a patient’s pro-
tected health information (PHI). We have shown that reasoning over non-sensitive
patient data and domain knowledge can generate a threat to patient privacy. We
have developed a formal framework to detect and eliminate privacy threats. We have
also implemented our privacy protection methods.
Our optimal solution uses an exhaustive method and evaluates the cost of every
possible solution that eliminates undesired inferences. We propose ontology-guided
data item alteration for inference removal. We have proven that it is possible to detect
and block all undesired inferences that resulted from combining non-sensitive data
with domain knowledge. We also showed that our approach provided maximal data
availability. Our theoretical contributions include: 1.) development of a Pre-Release
Inference Analyzer framework, 2.) inference removal methods based on optimal and
heuristic-based approaches, and 3.) graphical user interface to support patient-centric
privacy. We propose a cost measurement based on the number of data items that
must be altered to eliminate undesired inferences, the number of non-violating infer-
ences that are impacted by the alterations, patient preferences, and medical safety
characteristics.
We have built a proof-of-concept prototype of our models. Our empirical results
show that privacy protection against undesired inferences can be achieved. Our op-
143
timal cost solution, i.e., exhaustive approach, was not computationally efficient and
did not scale. We developed heuristics to improve the performance efficiency of our
approach while still providing a cost-effective solution. We proposed methods using
heuristics to reduce potential candidate solutions and quickly determined a feasible
solution. Our empirical results using heuristics reduced the computational complexity
by several orders of magnitude. We also enhanced our privacy model to incorporate
safety and patient privacy preferences. The performance characteristics of our pro-
totype implementation were not impacted by the extended cost function. Lastly, we
developed a graphical tool to support patients’ understanding of the privacy settings.
The tool provides tutorials as well as the ability for a patient to view their data along
with data generated by the inference process.
Future Research
Future research areas include the following:
• Investigate the practical aspects of integrating the PIA framework with com-
mercial healthcare applications. Medical databases, such as Epic, Cerner, and
Meditech, thoroughly restrict data-flows among trust domains. However, re-
cent announcements, such as the Apple’s inclusion of a patient Heath Record
module on their iPhone, indicates that this strictly controlled environment will
change.
• Investigate integration options between the GUI prototype and commercial
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems. Specifically, investigate options for
use of the HL7 Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) standard.
FHIR is quickly becoming available on must EMR platforms.
• Investigate incorporation of publicly available data in domain knowledge rea-
soning. Patients are, sometimes unknowingly, allowing personal devices, sensors
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and applications to collect and store data relevant to their health. If accessible,
this data could be leveraged to broaden the unintended inference threat.
• Investigate options for integration of the PIA framework and the GUI proto-
type with larger multi-ontology domain knowledge bases. Use existing data to
calculate entropy of data items and concepts.
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